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I. INTRODUCTION 
As I am writing this note, The Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (North Korea)1 is once again in the news after North Korean 
Leader Kim Jong-un executed his uncle for attempting to “grab the 
supreme power of the party and state by employing all the most cunning 
and sinister means and methods.”2 North Korea has maintained a 
significant place in the world spotlight, and with a young leader and such 
political instability,3 it will likely remain in the spotlight for a long time. 
Considering the prominence of North Korea in the world’s spotlight, this 
  
 1. Throughout this note, I will refer to the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea as North Korea. 
 2. Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed, KCNA (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201312/news13/20131213-05ee.html. The special military 
tribunal which examined Jang’s alleged crimes issued a decision which referred to Jang 
as a “anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional element and despicable political careerist 
and trickster.” Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Malcom Cook, North Korea’s unstable stability, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 
23, 2011),  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/20111222103516777902.html 
(suggesting that “[t]he most likely outcome of the . . . change in leadership in North 
Korea is a more unstable North Korea that continues to rely on nuclear weapons and a 
close if awkward relationship with China”); see also Stephen Bosworth & Robert 
Gallucci, Reasons to Talk to North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/reasons-to-talk-to-north-korea.html?_r=0 
(suggesting that the current relationship between the U.S. and North Korea is “unstable, 
and that matters will only get worse if not addressed directly”).  
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note will focus on the policy of North Korea’s immediate neighbor, and 
one of the United States’ closest allies – The Republic of Korea.4 
This note’s focus is on South Korea’s North Korea policy, and the 
major events that have occurred throughout the two Korea’s relationship. 
It will begin by examining the inter-Korean relationship from 1948 – 
1988, as well as each respective administration’s North Korea Policy. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the legal relationship between the 
two Koreas, this note will examine the Constitution of the South Korea, 
the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and subsequent agreements between the 
two Koreas. Focus will then shift to Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, 
which resulted in the famous meeting between President Kim and Kim 
Jong-il, and it will also look at President Roh Moo-hyun’s Peace and 
Prosperity policy. It will further examine the eventual 
“multilateralization” of inter-Korean relations. This note will examine 
the sharp change in North Korea policy that came with the Lee Myung-
bak Administration’s hardline Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity 
Policy. Finally, after a thorough review of the previous North Korean 
policies, focus will shift to current president Park Geun-hye who has 
taken a strong stance on North Korea while remaining markedly different 
from her predecessor.  Ultimately, this note will come to a conclusion 
about (1) how the future of inter-Korean relations should be shaped, and 
(2) what the South Koreans and the western world can expect from 
President Park’s North Korea policy. 
II. HISTORY OF NORTH KOREAN POLICY 
A. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea 
Before looking into the history of South Korea’s North Korean policy, 
it is worth emphasizing the importance of unification for Korea.5 To 
  
 4. Throughout this note, I will refer to the Republic of Korea as South Korea. 
 5. Professor Jeong-ho Roh notes that at a constitutional level, the two Koreas do 
not recognize themselves as separate states, but rather as one country. Jeong-ho Roh, The 
Legal and Institutional Approach to Inter-Korean Relations, in INTER-KOREAN 
RELATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 160, 161 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 2003). For 
example, the territorial clause of the South Korean constitution stipulates that “the 
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illustrate the importance of unification, one should first look to South 
Korea’s current constitution.6 The first paragraph of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Korea (South Korean Constitution) states:  
We, the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions 
dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional 
Republic of Korea Government . . . having assumed the mission of 
democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland and 
having determined to consolidate national unity with justice, 
humanitarianism and brotherly love.
7
 
The South Korean Constitution makes the mission of peaceful 
unification a mandatory and affirmative one: “The Republic of Korea 
shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of 
peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.”8  
The reason for focusing on each administration since the two Koreas 
were first created is that the President and executive branch of South 
Korea are responsible for shouldering this mission: “[t]he President shall 
have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of the 
homeland,” and “[e]xecutive power shall be vested in the Executive 
Branch and headed by the president.”9 In fact, the South Korean 
Constitution requires the President to give the following oath in his 
inauguration: “I do solemnly swear before the people that I will faithfully 
execute the duties of the President by observing the Constitution, 
defending the state, pursuing the peaceful unification of the homeland, 
promoting the freedom and welfare of the people and endeavoring to 
  
territory of the Republic of Korea shall extend to the Korean peninsula and its 
surrounding islands.” Id. Additionally, the North Korean constitution stipulates that “the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent socialist state representing the 
interest of all Korean People.” Id. 
 6. The current version of South Korea’s constitution was amended in 1988, and 
since the original 1948 constitution, the document has been amended eight times. This 
note will highlight each major amendment to the South Korean constitution to illustrate 
changing ideals regarding unification. 
 7. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter 1988 Constitution] (emphasis added). 
 8. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. art. 66 (emphasis added).  
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develop national culture.”10 The fact that pursuing the peaceful 
unification of the homeland is listed right between defending the state 
and promoting the freedom and welfare of the people shows where 
unification lies amongst the country’s priorities. 
A further reason for the focus on each administration’s North Korean 
policy is that, in addition to the President having the duty of seeking 
peaceful unification, the South Korean Constitution (1) allows the 
president to “submit important policies relating to . . . unification,” and 
(2) allows the executive branch to establish an “Advisory Council on 
Democratic and Peaceful Unification . . . to advise the President on the 
formulation of peaceful unification policy.”11 In short, the South Korean 
President determines North Korean policy, and unlike the United States, 
the South Korean President serves for one term of five years,12 and is 
therefore much less controlled by popular opinion once elected. It is with 
this background of the South Korean Constitution that this note begins its 
look through the North Korean policies and inter-Korean relations 
experienced during the tenure of each South Korean President since the 
two Koreas were created. 
B. Post War Korea & The 1953 Military Armistice Agreement 
The 38
th
 parallel was decided by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to be the dividing line between the two Koreas (much to the 
dislike of the Korean people) after Korea was liberated from the rule of 
Japan at the end of World War II.13 It is important to take note of the fact 
that there was not a single Korean person involved in this discussion of 
where to split up the country.14 Lack of focus on or knowledge of the 
  
 10. Id. art. 69 (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. arts. 72 & 92. 
 12. Id. art. 70. Please note, however, that the single five year term has only been 
a part of the South Korean constitution since 1987; Presidents Rhee and Park Chung-hee 
were in power for 12 and 20 years, respectively.  
 13. Sung-Yoon Lee, Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A Dead-End Street, 
27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151, 152-53 (Fall/Summer 2003). 
 14. Id. This “Korean decision” by two non-Korean countries perhaps 
foreshadowed the future light in which inter-Korean problems were to be solved. 
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Country was commonplace for the United States,15 and this lack of 
knowledge was likely of great importance and effect in the consequences 
of the Korean peninsula during the 1900s.16 Post World War II, the 
Soviets chose the young Kim Il-sung to lead North Korea and the United 
States chose 70-year-old Dr. Syngman Rhee to head South Korea.17 After 
three years of being under U.S. control, a constituent assembly was 
convened pursuant to an election to draft a Korean constitution in May of 
1948.18 The Constitution, due in part to the advocacy by President Rhee, 
contained a presidential and parliamentary component.19 In 1950, with 
the support of Stalin and Mao, Kim Il-sung and North Korea invaded 
South Korea amidst election tensions.20 After three years of fighting, the 
war came to an end, and representatives of the UN, the Korean People’s 
Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers signed a Military Armistice 
Agreement in 1953 (Armistice Agreement) agreeing to a cessation of 
hostilities on the Korean peninsula and the separation of the two Koreas 
along the 38
th
 parallel.21  
The Armistice Agreement requires a closer look because it remains, 
more or less, the sole document responsible for ending the hostilities of 
  
 15. During a 1945 meeting concerning the Korean Peninsula, then U.S. Secretary 
of State, Edward Stettinius asked a subordinate to inform him where Korea was located. 
DON OBERDORFER, THE TWO KOREAS: REVISED AND UPDATED A CONTEMPORARY 
HISTORY 5 (Basic Books, 2001) (1997).  
 16. See Balbina Hwang, Reviving the Korean Armistice: Building Future Peace 
on Historical Precedents, 6 KEI ACAD. PAPER SERIES 6, at 3 (June 2011). Even more 
offensive is than the 1945 Secretary of State not knowing where Korea was located on a 
map, is the fact that after the Russo-Japanese war, Secretary of War Taft approved of 
Japan’s control over the Korean peninsula in the Taft-Katsura Agreement signed on the 
27th of July, 1905. Id. at 2. Eventually, Japan’s control of Korea became codified in the 
Treaty of Portsmouth, “for which Theodore Roosevelt would be awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize as a peacemaker.” Id. at 2-3. 
 17. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 8.  
 18. Chi Young Pak, The Third Republic Constitution of Korea: An Analysis, W. 
POL. Q., Vol. 21, No. 1, 110, 110 (Mar. 1968). 
 19. Id. at 110-11.  
 20. Id.; S.C. Res 82 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/82 (June 25, 1950). Additionally Kim Il 
Sung claimed the invasion to be for the purpose of “liberat[ing] the south.” Lee, supra 
note 13, at 153.  
 21. Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplementary Agreement, July 
27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234 [hereinafter Armistice Agreement]. 
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the Korean War. The purpose of the Armistice Agreement was to achieve 
“a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in 
Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.”22 However, in the 60 
years since the Armistice Agreement came into force, there has been no 
such “peaceful settlement” to replace the Armistice Agreement.23 
Another important feature of the Armistice Agreement concerns the 
actual signatories of the Agreement; the original signatories include the 
general of the North Korean Army and a lieutenant-general of the United 
States signing in his capacity as a senior delegate of the United Nations 
Command Delegation.24 South Korea was not a signatory to the 
Armistice Agreement as President Rhee refused to sign the document 
due to his disagreement of dividing Korea at the 38
th
 parallel.25 This has 
had a significant impact on the “multilateralization” of inter-Korean 
issues in the 61 years since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, as 
North Korea, a party to the agreement, “equates the United States as its 
negotiating partner and as a proxy in its relations with South Korea 
regarding the resolution of . . . inter-Korean relations.”26 
The Armistice Agreement also established a Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ),27 which was to serve as a four kilometer “buffer zone to prevent 
the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of 
hostilities.”28 In addition to the separation of the two Koreas, the 
Armistice Agreement also established the Military Armistice 
Commission (MAC), which was designed “to supervise the 
implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through 
  
 22. Id. at pmbl.   
 23. Roh, supra note 5, at 159. 
 24. Armistice Agreement, supra note 21, art. XI. In a supplemental agreement 
dealing with prisoners of war, among other items, Kim Il-sung signed the document in his 
capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army along with the 
Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Commander-in-Chief of the UN 
Command. Id. at supp.   
 25. Hwang, supra note 16, at 5.  
 26. Roh, supra note 5, at 160. 
 27. The DMZ, as noted by many, is ironically one of the most heavily militarily 
fortified borders in the world today. See, e.g., id. at 4.  
 28. Armistice Agreement, supra note 21, art. I.  
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negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement,”29 and the 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), which was designed 
to monitor and investigate prohibited military actions within the DMZ, 
and report to the MAC their findings.30 
Another important and dangerous feature of the Armistice Agreement 
concerns “[t]he absence of a maritime demarcation line.”31 The Armistice 
Agreement mentions five “coastal islands” near the land border of the 
two Koreas that were to be under United Nations Command (UNC) 
control.32 Despite mentioning specific islands that were to be under 
control of UNC, there is no exact maritime border given by the Armistice 
Agreement.33 The reason for the lack of a present maritime border is 
because during the negotiations surrounding the Armistice Agreement 
the two sides could not agree to an exact maritime border.34 The issue of 
a maritime border was deferred to a later date, and the UNC established a 
de facto Northern Limit Line (NLL), which has been the source of many 
“deadly incidents.”35 
The Armistice Agreement, while not a permanent peace treaty, was 
still successful in ending serious conflicts and preventing a major war;36 
however, in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War there was little 
  
 29. Id. art. II, ¶ 24. 
 30. Id. art. II, ¶ 41. Each side of the agreement was allowed to nominate two 
nations to serve in the NNSC. North Korea selected Poland and Czechoslovakia, two 
former communist nations, whereas the U.N. selected Sweden and Switzerland. Id. art. II, 
¶ 37. 
 31. Hwang, supra note 16, at 5. 
 32. Armistice Agreement, supra note 21, art. II, ¶ 13b. One of the five coastal 
islands mentioned in the Armistice Agreement is Yeonpyeong Island, which was 
subjected to a 2011 shelling by North Korea. See infra notes 189-94.  
 33. Hwang, supra note 16, at 5.   
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. However, it should be noted that North Korea has unilaterally declared the 
Armistice Agreement “null and void” on multiple occasions, most recently in 2013. See, 
e.g., Important Measures to Defend Nation’s Sovereignty, Dignity and Country’s 
Supreme Interests: CPRK, KCNA (Mar. 8, 2013),  
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201303/news08/20130308-01ee.html. On March 8, 
2013, North Korea “abrogate[d] all agreements reached on nonaggression” between the 
two Koreas, nullified the 1992 Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula, and ultimately declared that the Armistice Agreement is “totally invalid.” Id. 
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conversation between the two Koreas as one of the main consequences of 
the war was the “hardening of ideological and political lines between 
[North Korea and South Korea].”37 The South Korean Constitution was 
amended two additional times during Rhee’s tenure in order to allow 
Rhee to be reelected and “perpetuate [his] personal powers.”38 South 
Korea generally became corrupt and continually dictatorial, and 
eventually a 1960 student-led revolution led to President Rhee being 
forced out of office.39 
C. North Korea Policy under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan 
After Rhee was forced out of office, the Constitution was amended 
again, and the Constitution of the Second Republic was adopted.40 This 
version of the Constitution was designed to address the weaknesses of 
the original constitution, and it created “a Constitutional Court, 
neutralized the national police,” and allowed for “laws designed to 
punish anti-democratic elements.”41 The Constitution of the Second 
Republic placed all of the important constitutional powers in the National 
Assembly and created a weakened executive position, which was filled 
by Dr. John M. Chang.42 However, the weakness of the executive 
position and the scattering of political parties created a “shaky 
government,” and eventually the military seized control of the Country in 
May of 1961.43 
It was Major-General Park Chung-hee who seized control of the 
government in the coup,44 and nearly two years after Park seized control 
  
 37. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 10. 
 38. Pak, supra note 18, at 111-12. 
 39. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 10. Rhee went into voluntary exile in Hawaii 
and died in 1965 at the age of 90. Syngman Rhee: First president of South Korea, 
CNNFYI.COM, 
http://edition.cnn.com/fyi/school.tools/profiles/Syngman.Rhee/frameset.exclude.html 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
 40. Pak, supra note 18, at 112. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 10. 
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of the Country, elections were held in 1963 in which Park was elected 
President and a new National Assembly was elected.45 One month after 
the National Assembly was elected, another constitutional amendment 
was passed creating what is known as the Third Republic of Korea.46 The 
Constitution of the Third Republic of Korea created a stronger, and 
potentially authoritarian, executive position due to the perceived failures 
of the previous constitution, and was largely a return to the 1948 
Constitution that existed during the Rhee regime.47 
When Park Chung-hee took control of the country, his past ties to 
communism48 created fear in Washington and hope for new dialogue in 
Pyongyang.49 This hope caused Kim Il-sung to dispatch a trusted aid to 
meet with Park; however, instead of meeting with North Korea’s aid, 
Park had the aid executed.50 As South Korea became more economically 
stable51 and grew ties with the United States and Japan, Kim Il-sung grew 
convinced that the best way to bring about reunification was via 
unconventional war.52 This unconventional war characterized much of 
the North-South interaction during the Park regime: in January of 1968, a 
31-man North Korean unit attempted to storm the Blue House53 to “cut 
  
 45. Pak, supra note 18, at 113; Jinwung Kim, A HISTORY OF KOREA: FROM 
“LAND OF THE MORNING CALM” TO STATES IN CONFLICT 435 (Indiana University Press 
2012). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMMING, THE NEXT FRONTIER: 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA 157 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) (noting that Park Chung Hee was actually sentenced to 
death by President Rhee for a role in an army revolt, and that his brother was killed for 
his role in a communist uprising). 
 49. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 10. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Don Oberdorfer, in illustrating the economic difficulties that South Korea 
experienced after the war, described his first impressions of Busan, South Korea as 
“miserable and pathetic.” Id. at xi.  
 52. DANIEL P. BOLGER, SCENES FROM AN UNFINISHED WAR: LOW-INTENSITY 
CONFLICT IN KOREA, 1966-1969 3 (1991), available at 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ScenesFromanUnfinishedWar.pd
f.  
 53. The Blue House, literally the “pavilion of blue tiles,” is the home of the 
President of the Republic of Korea. See www.president.go.kr.  
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off the head of Park Chung Hee,”54 and just a few days later North Korea 
captured the USS Pueblo.55  
1. The 1972 Joint Statement & The Yusin Constitution  
There was some positive interaction, however, between the two 
Koreas under Park Chung-hee. In 1971, members of the two Korean Red 
Cross Societies proposed meetings between high-ranking officials from 
the two Koreas.56 Early in 1972, the Deputy Director of the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was taken to Pyongyang to meet 
with a high-ranking North Korean official, marking the first occasion for 
a South Korean official to go to Pyongyang for talks.57 Then in late April, 
the head of the KCIA went to Pyongyang, was awakened in the middle 
of the night, and taken to meet Kim Il-sung.58 The meeting was 
considered a success,59 and it led to the issuance of a 1972 Joint 
Statement where peaceful reunification was finally made a goal for both 
Koreas, which was signed by the KCIA head and Kim Il-sung himself.60  
This 1972 Joint Statement served to shape the relationship of the two 
Koreas going forward. The two countries agreed upon the following 
  
 54. BOLGER, supra note 52, at 62. The attempt failed because the unit divulged 
their plans when attempting to “indoctrinate” some South Korean woodsmen who later 
informed the police of the attack. Id. at 63. Don Oberdorfer notes that Kim Il Sung later 
apologized for the assassination attempt, and, while unlikely, claimed that he had no 
knowledge of the operation. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 24. 
 55. BOLGER, supra note 52, at 66.  
 56. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 14. 
 57. Id. at 15. This was an important visit, as Oberdorfer notes that the KCIA was 
a very powerful agency, and that the director of the KCIA was likely the second most 
feared government official in Korea. Id.  
 58. Id. at 16. This was a tremendously important meeting between the President 
of North Korea and the second most powerful person in South Korea. Id. at 23.   
 59. Kim Il Sung actually labeled the KCIA head “a hero” for “making the 
journey to the opposite camp.” Id.  
 60. July 4th North-South Joint Statement, Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and the Republic of Korea, July 4, 1972 [hereinafter 1972 Joint Statement] 
(emphasis added), available at  
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/7
4js-en.htm. 
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three principles for reunification: (1) “the reunification must be achieved 
with no reliance on external forces or interference;” (2) “the 
reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military 
forces against the other side;” and (3) “both parties must promote 
national unity as a united people over any differences [between] 
ideological and political systems.”61 The 1972 Joint Statement’s language 
that unification must be achieved with “no reliance on external forces or 
interference” is important because North Korea’s ultimate desire to 
pursue a bilateral relationship62 with the United States likely added to the 
“multilateralization” of inter-Korean relations.  
Additionally, the focus on unification that was evident in the 1972 
Joint Statement also found its place in the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic (Yushin Constitution) that was amended just months after the 
Agreement.63 While it is very likely that the main goal of the Yusin 
Constitution was to give Park greater authoritarian control and remove 
the two-term limit on his presidency,64 it did mark the first version of the 
Korean Constitution featuring the concept of a “peaceful unification.”65 
The Yusin Constitution also gave us the current language regarding the 
President’s “duty to pursue the peaceful unification of the homeland,” as 
well as the current concept of the president mentioning peaceful 
unification in the inaugural oath.66 
Despite the monumental progress in the talks that gave us the 1972 
Joint Statement, it was hardly smooth sailing afterwards. In 1972, future 
president and the voice of a large opposition, Kim Dae-jung, was 
kidnapped in Tokyo by the KCIA, which North Korea gave for its reason 
as suspending ongoing North-South talks.67 Later in 1974, in another 
  
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Roh, supra note 5, at 163 (“[A]s a party to the Military Armistice 
Agreement, North Korea . . . equates the United States as its negotiating partner and as a 
proxy in its relations with South Korea.”).  
 63. 1972 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl., arts. 37-
43, 46 (Dec. 27, 1972) (S. Kor.) [hereinafter 1972 Constitution]. 
 64. MARK PETERSON & PHILLIP MARGUILES, BRIEF HISTORY: BRIEF HISTORY OF 
KOREA 223 (2009).   
 65. 1972 Constitution, supra note 63, at pmbl. 
 66. Id. at arts. 66 & 69. 
 67. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 42-43. 
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assassination attempt on President Park, Mun Se-kwang mistakenly shot 
the then first lady,68 and South Korean investigators determined Mun, a 
Japanese resident, was part of a plot orchestrated by the North Korean 
government.69 Furthermore, the murder of South Korean and American 
soldiers in the Joint Security Area (JSA) did not help tensions between 
the two Koreas.70  
In 1978, a South Korean-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) 
was created to take over duties from the UNC, which had been 
responsible for the defense of the South Korea since the Korean War.71 
This CFC consisted of a U.S. Commander-in-Chief answerable to the 
command authorities of the U.S. and South Korea, and a Deputy 
Commander from South Korea.72 The shift from the UNC to the CFC 
was rather important since there were no Korean members in the UNC.73 
Shortly thereafter, U.S. President Jimmy Carter created high tension 
regarding the withdrawal of U.S. Soldiers from the Korean peninsula,74 
and President Park was met with yet another assassination attempt, this 
time the attempt was successful. In October 1979, President Park was 
shot and killed by KCIA director Kim Jae Gyu.75 President Park was 
briefly replaced by Choi Kyu-ha pursuant to the 1972 Yusin 
Constitution; however, in another coup, General Chun Doo Hwan took 
control of the military in December of 1979.76 In early 1980, amidst large 
numbers of student and political opposition protests demanding 
democracy, General Chun arrested many protesters and three powerful 
political figures (two future presidents and one prime minister), declared 
  
 68. Id. at 47. 
 69. EDWARD F. MICKOLUS & SUSAN L. SIMMONS, THE TERRORIST LIST 166 
(Praeger, 2011).   
 70. This was the only part of the demilitarized zone without fortifications. 
OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 74.  
 71. Hwang, supra note 16, at 5. 
 72. Id. at 5-6. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 101-09.  
 75. Id. at 109-10. It should also be noted that a senior South Korean Official 
claimed that during President’s Park’s funeral, “there was not a wet eye in Seoul.” Id. at 
113.   
 76. Id. at 116-17.  
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martial law, and shut down all universities.77 These military activities and 
arrests caused great unrest and further demonstration and riots in 
Kwangju, until the South Korean military put an end to the 
demonstration resulting in 240 deaths.78  
General Chun instituted a new Constitution in 1980 after the military 
takeover, and then in early August of 1980, acting President Choi 
stepped down79 and General Chun was elected as the first President of 
the Fifth Republic without opposition.80 While the Yusin Constitution 
was amended after Chun seized power of the country, the concept of 
unification did not disappear; as a matter of fact, nearly the same 
language regarding unification appeared in the 1980 Constitution as was 
present in the 1972 Yushin Constitution.81 Regarding inter-Korean 
relations under Chun, one of the first and more gruesome interactions 
with North Korea took place in Rangoon, Burma.82 This interaction 
involved the bombing of the Martyr’s Mausoleum before President Chun 
arrived, and 17 senior officials from South Korea were killed.83 President 
Chun responded that “the killings were ‘a grave provocation not unlike a 
declaration of war,’ and warned North Korea that ‘should such a 
provocation recur, there would be a corresponding retaliation in kind.’”84 
Despite a strong urge from high-ranking South Korean military officials 
  
 77. Id. at 125. 
 78. Id. at 127, 129.  
 79. Id. at 132-33.  
 80. Dae-sook Suh, South Korea in 1981: The First Year of the Fifth Republic, 22 
ASIAN SURVEY 107, 107 (Jan. 1982). 
 81. 1980 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] (Oct. 27, 1980) 
(S. Kor.) pmbl., arts. 38 & 44 [hereinafter 1980 Constitution]. One of the big changes 
regarding unification was with the National Council for Unification. 1972 Constitution, 
supra note 63, ch. 3. In Yushin Constitution, Chapter 3 consisted of a very thorough 
instruction regarding the National Council for Unification and its duties and form. Id. 
This section was not entirely present in the 1980 Constitution; however, the 1980 
Constitution still allowed for a similar council to be established that would focus on 
reunification. 1980 Constitution, supra, art. 68. 
 82. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 140-41. 
 83. DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30004, NORTH KOREA: 
CHRONOLOGY OF PROVOCATIONS, 1950 – 2003 8 (2003), available at  
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf. 
 84. Id. 
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to carry out a punitive response, President Chun demonstrated restraint 
and took no retaliatory counteractions.85 Around the same time of the 
bombing, North Korea proposed through China that it was open to three-
way talks with South Korea and the United States in an effort to bring 
peace to the Korean peninsula.86 However, neither the United States nor 
South Korea was keen to the idea at the time the talks were proposed.87 
There also was more peaceful interaction during Chun’s tenure as 
president, and this took place when North Korea offered food support to 
the South after strong rains and landslides left hundreds dead and 
hundreds of thousands homeless; this was the first time since the end of 
the Korean War that North Korean trucks entered the south carrying 
supplies.88 In the mid 1980s the two Koreas held 13 public meetings, and 
over 60 people were allowed to cross the border to visit family 
members.89 There was also something referred to as “secret diplomacy” 
where President Chun authorized a government official to meet in secret 
with North Korean officials.90 Chun authorized his liaison in the secret 
diplomacy to inform the North Korean Officials that Chun was willing to 
meet Kim Il-sung in North Korea, South Korea, or other countries.91 
However, this remained the high point in potential hope for a face-to-
face meeting of the two Korean leaders as talks failed following a North 
Korean proposal for a nonaggression agreement, which was largely 
unacceptable for South Korea.92 
  
 85. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 143. 
 86. Id. at 144. 
 87. Id. at 147. 
 88. Id. at 148. The offer for help from North Korea was likely given in order to 
demonstrate its superiority over those in South Korea. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 150. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 151-52. North Korea requested that the U.S.-South Korea joint military 
exercise be called off, which was unacceptable for South Korea. Id. at 152. The joint 
exercise involved 200,000 South Korean and U.S. forces just south of the DMZ. Id. 
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2. The Origins of North Korea’s Nuclear Program93 
After desiring to develop a nuclear infrastructure of its own, in late 
1985, North Korea succeeded in getting the Soviet Union to supply it 
with four light-water nuclear power reactors.94 In response to pressure 
from the United States, the Soviet Union conditioned the supply of the 
nuclear reactors upon North Korea joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and before the agreement was made, North Korea joined 
the NPT.95 Pursuant to the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) is the body responsible for creating a framework of safeguards 
designed to monitor the flow of nuclear materials.96 Under the NPT, 
North Korea “agreed not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons and 
to accept international inspection of all its nuclear facilities to verify that 
weapons were not being produced,” and North Korea’s accession to the 
NPT created “legal justification for intervention by the United States, the 
  
 93. The origins of North Korea’s nuclear program actually dates back to World 
War II when Japan was pursuing a nuclear program in the northern part of its then 
Korean colony. Id. at 251. After World War II, The Soviet Union began mining materials 
in the North to further its nuclear program. Id. at 252. After the end of the Korean War, 
the Soviet Union and North Korea made agreements to cooperate in nuclear research, and 
this led to some North Korean scientists working at a Soviet nuclear research center. Id. 
The Soviet Union also provided North Korea with a “small experimental nuclear reactor” 
placed in Yongbyon, North Korea; this reactor was placed under inspection by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Id. Then once in the 60’s and once in the 
70’s, Kim Il Sung reportedly, and ultimately unsuccessfully, requested Chinese aid in its 
quest for its own nuclear weapons. Id. at 252-253. Ultimately, it is believed that North 
Korea launched its own program around 1979; U.S. intelligence cameras eventually 
photographed this reactor in 1982. Id. at 253.  
 94. Id. The goal of the NPT is “to achieve . . . the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.” Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483 
[hereinafter NPT]. Currently there are 190 nations party to the NPT. Status of the NPT, 
UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt. 
 95. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 254. 
 96. NPT, supra note 94, at pmbl. More specifically, each party “undertake[s] to 
cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] 
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.” Id. 
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United Nations, and the international community generally to curb North 
Korea’s Nuclear Program.”97  
In late 1987, President Chun, having promised to serve only one 
presidential term and amidst more democracy protests, began to plan for 
his succession.98 Chun announced that General Roh Tae-woo, a long-
time friend and associate of President Chun, would be his party’s 
candidate in the coming election.99 Shortly thereafter, the current version 
of South Korea’s constitution, with no changes to the goal of unification, 
was adopted by a national referendum,100 and in December of 1987, Roh 
  
 97. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 253. 
 98. Id. at 162-63.  
 99. Id. at 166. With the election, however, there was a serious issue of a 
constitutional revision to be dealt with; the opposition party and the ruling party could not 
agree on an outline for a revised constitution—would there be a parliamentary system or 
a presidential system with a direct election? Han Sung-Joo, South Korea in 1987: The 
Politics of Democritazation, 28 ASIAN SURV., 1, 52, 54 (Jan. 1988). Due to the difficulty 
in negotiating with the opposition party over a constitutional revision, President Chun 
made a “grave” choice to suspend all such talks. Id. at 53. However, political unrest 
continued to grow, and amidst widespread demonstrations demanding democracy, 
President Chun decided to meet with Kim Young-sam, officially chosen as the opposition 
party’s candidate, to inform Kim Young-sam that he would “allow” resumption of the 
constitutional revision talks. Id. at 54. Kim Young-sam, instead, demanded that the 
government should agree to an immediate national referendum so that the public could 
chose between the parliamentary and presidential systems. Id. Despite being a close 
associate of President Chun, Roh surprised many by campaigning on freedom of 
expression for the press, autonomy for universities, and amnesty for Kim Dae-jung 
(which was very surprising as President Kim was actually sentenced to death under the 
Chun administration). OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 172; Kim Dae-jung – Biographical, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG,  
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/dae-jung-bio.html  
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014). Furthermore, Roh’s eight-point proposal included a “speedy 
amendment” to allow for direct presidential elections, and considering President Chun 
was effectively backed into a corner, this proposal was promptly accepted by Chun. Han, 
supra, at 54. This turn of events caused General Roh to be “acclaimed as a hero by many 
Koreans.” OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 172. 
 100. Han, supra note 99, at 55. The 1988 Constitution is still in force today, and, 
as mentioned earlier in the note, it gives the President the affirmative duty of seeking 
“peaceful unification.” 1988 Constitution, supra note 7, art. 72. 
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Tae-woo was elected as the President of South Korea with 36% of the 
popular vote.101  
D. North Korea Policy under Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam 
As the first President of the Sixth republic, and having the duty of 
seeking peaceful unification pursuant to the current constitution, 
President Roh’s policy towards North Korea involved improving 
relations with socialist nations and allies of North Korea in order to 
compete with North Korea and cause them to be more cooperative; this 
policy was labeled Nordpolitik.102 After Roh officially declared 
Nordpolitik as his North Korea policy, Kim Il-sung responded that Roh’s 
policy was intended to permanently split up the country.103 President Roh 
sought help from the United States and Japan, and focused on four 
nations (six including the two Koreas) to improve relations with North 
Korea: The United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.104 Roh, as 
the first South Korean president to address the UN General Assembly, 
pledged never to use force against North Korea, and, in very much 
keeping with constitutional mandate regarding peaceful unification and 
with recommendations of the Armistice Agreement, to seek to replace 
the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.105 Additionally, under 
Nordpolitik, many South Korean business leaders became aware of 
potential business benefits that would come with improved relations with 
North Korea.106  
At the time, Roh’s Nordpolitik had proved successful, and it helped to 
create a direct channel for diplomatic business between North Korea and 
the United States.107 Additionally, under Roh, South Korea and the 
  
 101. Id. at 178. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung (two future presidents) split 
the popular vote. Id. 
 102. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY 
STUDY 252 [hereinafter AREA HANDBOOK SERIES], available at  
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/krtoc.html.  
 103. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 188-89.  
 104. See AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, supra note 102, at 261.  
 105. Id. at 255. 
 106. Id. at 261. 
 107. See OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 196.  
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Soviet Union experienced improved relations with the Roh 
Administration approving visits by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, 
both future presidents and influential politicians at the time, to Moscow; 
South Korea and Moscow were natural partners due to South Korea’s 
good technology, consumer goods, a thriving economy, and the overall 
proximity between the two countries.108 Due to this improved 
relationship between Seoul and Moscow, as one author put it, “the Soviet 
Union was transformed . . . from godfather, superpower guarantor, and 
economic benefactor of North Korea to partner . . . and client of South 
Korea.”109 Eventually Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met with 
President Roh in 1990, and Roh welcomed Soviet efforts to help bring 
peace to the Korean peninsula.110 However, when the Soviets attempted 
to pass on Roh’s message of requesting reduced military confrontation 
on the Korean peninsula, it was not well received by North Korea.111 The 
goals of Nordpolitik were responsible for the continued 
“multilateralization” of inter-Korean relations, and unfortunately may 
have been responsible for some deterioration of the Armistice 
Agreement; “in April of 1991, [North Korea] declared the NNSC112 
defunct . . . [as the] nominated countries associated with North Korea 
were no longer communist nations.”113 The MAC, on the other hand, 
  
 108. AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, supra note 102, at 256.  
 109. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 197.  
 110. Id. at 212. 
 111. Id. In fact, North Korea referred to Roh’s message as “an unbelievable 
concentration of lies and slander.” Id. Additionally, Nordpolitik brought improved 
relations with China, albeit not to the extent of the development in South Korean-Soviet 
relations, and the two nations began to trade actively. AREA HANDBOOK SERIES, supra 
note 102, at 259. Chinese trade with South Korea grew from $19 million in 1979 to $1.3 
billion in 1988, while Chinese trade with North Korea fell far behind. OBERDORFER, 
supra note 15, at 240.  
 112. Armistice Agreement, supra note 21, ¶ 41. 
 113. Hwang, supra note 16, at 4. After the split of Czechoslovakia, North Korea 
refused to acknowledge the Czech Republic as its replacement, and it ejected the Polish 
delegation and has since boycotted NNSC activities. Id. 
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remains active, but has seen its importance shrink since its creation in 
1953.114 
1. The Emergence of North Korea’s Nuclear Program 
Pursuant to the NPT, North Korea was given eighteen months to sign 
a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but due to certain bureaucratic 
mishaps, North Korea received an additional eighteen months, and by 
December 1988, North Korea was without an accord and still without the 
reactors it had originally sought from the Soviet Union.115 Later in 1989, 
U.S. satellites had generated pictures that worried American officials 
about the continuing development of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at 
Yongbyon.116 In similar fashion to Roh’s Nordpolitik, the American 
government decided to seek cooperation from other major powers in 
order to “build international pressure against North Korea to force them 
to . . . sign a safeguards agreement permitting inspections.”117 
Amidst mounting tensions over North Korea signing a safeguards 
agreement, North Korea held strong to its position that it would not 
permit IAEA inspections while there was a threat of a U.S. nuclear attack 
with weapons stationed in South Korea.118 As a result, in the spring of 
1991, U.S.-South Korea discussions over what to do with the U.S. 
nuclear weapons in South Korea commenced; however, despite the 
possibility of removing U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula 
being used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with North Korea, the 
discussions concluded without a formal agreement.119 In August of 1991, 
the U.S. announced, due to the beginnings of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the removal of nuclear weapons from all U.S. forces 
worldwide.120 When the U.S. finally removed the last American nuclear 
  
 114. Id. Between 1953 and 1991, the MAC met 459 times, but the general 
meetings were suspended when North Korea boycotted the MAC due to South Korean 
general being appointed to the Chief Representative Position. Id. 
 115. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 254-55. 
 116. Id. at 255. 
 117. Id. at 256. 
 118. Id. at 256-57. 
 119. Id. at 258-59. 
 120. Id. at 259.  
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weapons from the Korean peninsula, North Korea was allowed to inspect 
the U.S. base in South Korea where the weapons used to be stored; this 
compromise was a breakthrough, which generated a lot of progress in 
inter-Korean relations.121  
2. The Bilateral Agreements of the Early 90s 
Towards the end of the Roh Administration, a summit between the 
leaders of the two Koreas was an important goal.122 In October of 1991, 
after America’s decision to remove its nuclear weapons from the 
peninsula, the two Koreas made noteworthy progress in the Agreement 
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation 
between the North and South (1991 Agreement).123 This groundbreaking 
1991 Agreement involved the two Koreas agreeing to respect one 
another’s political systems, not to slander or interfere with the internal 
politics of one another, to endeavor to replace the armistice with a peace 
agreement, and to create a South-North liaison office and political 
committee to bring about successful implementation of the agreement.124 
Additionally, in the 1991 Agreement, the two Koreas agreed not to use 
force with one another, but to resolve all disputes peacefully through 
negotiations.125 Regarding unification, the 1991 Agreements notes that 
the “inter-Korean relations, ‘not being a relationship as between states, is 
a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification.’”126 
Also noteworthy is the language that the two countries “shall together 
endeavo[]r to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of 
peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present . . . Armistice 
  
 121. Id. at 259-60. 
 122. Id. at 261.  
 123. See Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and 
Cooperation between the South and North, S. Kor.-N.Kor., Dec. 13, 1991 [hereinafter 
1991 Agreement], available at  
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/c
oree91.html. 
 124. Id. arts. 1-3, 5, 7. 
 125. Id. art 10. 
 126. Roh, supra note 5, at 161 (quoting 1991 Agreement, supra note 123, pmbl.). 
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Agreement until such a state of peace is realized.”127  The 1991 
Agreement marked the first time since the Armistice Agreement that the 
two Koreas had both called for adherence to the Armistice Agreement.128 
However, there was nothing regarding North Korea’s nuclear program to 
be found in the 1991 Agreement, and this was quite troubling to the 
international community considering that North Korea had not reached a 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA since it acceded to the NPT in 
1985.129  
The nuclear issue was soon dealt with in late December of 1991,130 
when North Korea gave clearance for inspection of their nuclear program 
as well as for a bilateral nuclear accord (1992 Accord), which was signed 
in January of 1992, to be worked out with South Korea.131 Under the 
1992 Accord that was finally worked out between the two Koreas, South 
Korea agreed to cancel a joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise in 
exchange for North Korea’s willingness to allow foreign inspectors to 
look into its nuclear facilities.132 Moreover, both countries agreed “not to 
‘test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear 
weapons,’ and not to ‘possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment facilities,’” and both sides also agreed to inspections of 
facilities by the other side.133 Sadly, this agreement would not be the end 
of struggle regarding nuclear facilities and North Korean Policy.134 Citing 
  
 127. 1991 Agreement, supra note 123, art. 5.  
 128. Roh, supra note 5, at 162. 
 129. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 253-54. 
 130. Id. at 260. 
 131. Id. at 263. 
 132. Id. at 264. It is important to remember that pursuant to the NPT, North Korea 
was required to work out an agreement with the IAEA. NPT, supra note 94, art. III. 
Considering that it had been nearly seven years since acceding to the NPT without 
signing an agreement with the IAEA, the nuclear issue was of tremendous importance at 
the time. 
 133. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 264. See also Joint Declaration of the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Accord], available at  
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/k
oreadenuclearization.htm. 
 134. According to a South Korean General present at the negotiations of the 1992 
Accord, it was believed that South Korea pushed North Korea too hard in the 
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the absence of meaningful improvement of North-South relations, South 
Korea and the US resumed the planned military exercises that they 
previously cancelled to accommodate North Korea, and North Korea 
responded by cancelling ongoing North-South contacts.135 
3. The 1992 IAEA Inspections 
Despite no deal worked out between North Korea and the IAEA 
pursuant to the NPT, the IAEA had actually been inspecting the small 
research reactor, supplied by the then Soviet Union, since 1977; 
however, the inspectors had only been allowed to inspect the small 
research reactor and not the entirety of the growing complex.136 In a visit 
to North Korea in May of 1992, the IAEA discovered that the facility had 
grown to an “imposing” size, and was nearly 80% complete.137 During 
this visit, North Korea presented the IAEA with a small vial of 
plutonium produced in its facility which suggested the capability of 
producing a larger quantity and raised questions over whether North 
Korea “had squirreled some away.”138 This inspection led the IAEA to 
realize that North Korea required far more thorough inspections.139 
As President Roh’s authority began to wane with his term coming to a 
close, the coming presidential election gave rise to debate over future 
inter-Korean relations, and in early October, South Korea and the U.S. 
announced intentions to resume preparations for a joint U.S.-South 
Korea Team Spirit military exercise.140 North Korea referred to 
resumption of preparations for the joint military exercises as a “‘criminal 
  
negotiations, and this caused one North Korean general to exclaim, “this is your 
agreement, not our agreement.” OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 264. 
 135. Id. at 272-73. 
 136. Id. at 268. 
 137. Id. at 269. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 270.  
 140. Id. at 272. This is likely because Kim Young-sam feared that “continuation of 
the North-South euphoria of earlier months would benefit . . . Kim Dae Jung, who was 
shaping up as . . . his principal competitor . . . .” Id. The preparations of the joint military 
actions were rather perplexing since the cancellation of the 1992 exercise was highly 
important in bringing about the IAEA inspections of Yongbyon. Id. at 272-73. 
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act’ designed to ‘put the brakes on North-South relations,’” and 
eventually hinted that it might refuse to allow IAEA inspections.141 
Eventually, the IAEA obtained permission to visit two apparent nuclear 
sites at Yongbyon, where U.S. satellites had photographed the 
construction.142 One of the nuclear sites was a two-story complex; 
however, when IAEA inspectors arrived, only the top floor was visible, 
and North Korea claimed the lower floor did not exist.143 After months of 
contention, the IAEA desired a special inspection of these two suspected 
nuclear sites, but North Korea responded that there could be no 
inspection of non-nuclear facilities as that “might jeopardize [North 
Korea’s] supreme interests”; this was a clear reference to Article X, the 
escape clause of the NPT.144 In February of 1993, the IAEA board 
demanded that North Korea permit inspection of the two suspected 
nuclear sites, and because of Chinese requests, provided North Korea 
with one month to comply.145 Right in the middle of this quickly 
deteriorating inter-Korean state of affairs, Kim Young-sam was elected 
to be the next South Korean president,146 and North Korea “switch[ed] to 
a state of readiness of war” in response to the U.S.-South Korea military 
exercises, and in March of 1993 announced that it was withdrawing from 
the NPT.147 
  
 141. Id. at 273. 
 142. Id. at 274-75. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 276; NPT, supra note 94, art. X (“Each Party shall in exercising its 
national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country.”). 
 145. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 277-78. 
 146. Id. at 279. 
 147. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Pursuant to Article X of the NPT, North 
Korea stated the joint exercises violated the 1992 Joint Accord, and that the IAEA 
demand was designed to disarm and dismantle North Korea’s socialist society. Id. at 280.  
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4. 1993 Bilateral Negotiations Between the U.S. and North 
Korea 
In June of 1993, officials from the U.S. and North Korea began 
negotiations in the wake of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, and 
with only ten days before the withdrawal became effective.148 The U.S. 
assured North Korea “against ‘the threat of use of force, including 
nuclear weapons’ and against ‘interference in each other’s internal 
affairs,’” and both sides eventually agreed to a joint statement which 
prevented North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, but ultimately did 
not solve any of the ongoing IAEA inspection difficulties.149 If grading 
these negotiations under a rubric based on North Korea negotiating 
bilaterally with the U.S., then North Korea was very successful in the 
outcome of these negotiations.150  
Responding to these bilateral U.S.-North Korea negotiations, newly 
elected president, Kim Young-sam, voiced criticism over the negotiation 
process.151 Regarding President Kim’s North Korea policy, he stated in 
his inaugural address that he would meet with Kim Il Sung at any time or 
place and that “no ally can be more valuable than national kinship;”152 
however, the Kim Young-sam Administration was widely thought of as 
“confus[ed] regarding its North Korean policy.”153 Moreover, it became 
clearer that public opinion was a driving force behind President Kim’s 
North Korean policy.154  
In continued talks, North Korea announced that it was willing to 
switch its nuclear development program to light-water reactors (LWRs) 
  
 148. Id. at 284. 
 149. Id. at 285.  
 150. Id. at 287. 
 151. Id. Newly elected President Kim Young-sam voiced his criticism over the 
negotiation process claiming that North Korea was merely “buy[ing] time to finish their 
project” and that the U.S. was being “led on by North Korea.” Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Kibum Han, North Korea’s South Korea Policy: An Evaluation of  
Determining Variables and Prospects for 2012, 20 INT’L J. KOREAN UNIFICATION STUD. 
27, 36 n.11 (2011). 
 154. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 288. 
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supplied by the international community.155 The U.S. eventually agreed 
to “support the introduction of LWRs and . . . explore with [North Korea] 
ways in which LWRs could be obtained,” but the U.S. conditioned this 
on being part of a “final resolution” regarding North Korea’s nuclear 
program.156 Eventually, IAEA inspectors were allowed to return to 
Yongbyon in August, but they were not permitted to perform the desired 
special inspections of the two suspected nuclear sites which the IAEA 
had continuously demanded the opportunity to inspect.157 
In October of 1993, negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea 
continued, and North Korea claimed that it would submit to regular 
IAEA inspections and discuss the “special inspections” demanded by the 
IAEA in return for an end to the U.S.-South Korea military exercises, 
lifting of American economic sanctions, and continued bilateral 
negotiations.158 A month later, the U.S. gave North Korea its deal which 
included a resumption of IAEA inspections and continued inter-Korean 
dialogue in exchange for the cancellation of the 1994 U.S.-South Korea 
joint military exercise and continuing bilateral talks between the U.S. and 
North Korea.159 After this “package deal” appeared in the news, President 
Kim Young-sam again voiced his disapproval,160 and expressed that it 
appeared that the United States was accommodating North Korea 
without having South Korea involved in the negotiation process;161 North 
Korea’s success in getting bilateral negotiations with the United States 
did not appear to please Kim Young Sam and South Korea. Negotiations 
regarding North Korea’s nuclear program began to prove difficult, and it 
  
 155. Id. at 289. LWRs are more complex reactors than the ones previously in 
possession by the North; they were also far more efficient. Id. 
 156. Id. at 291.  
 157. Id. at 292. 
 158. Id. at 293. 
 159. Id. at 295.  
 160. President Kim Young-sam did not like the fact that South Korea was not the 
dominant force in North Korean policy, and resented the concept of the “package deal” 
which was something that political rival Kim Dae-jung had publically supported; “[i]f 
[Kim Dae-jung] was for it, Kim Young-sam was automatically against it.” Id. at 295-96. 
 161. Id. This was a surprise to most Americans as it was expected that President 
Kim would simply put his stamp of approval on the negotiations. Id. 
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became apparent that North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., and the IAEA 
all had to be present for talks to succeed.162 
5. The Nuclear Crisis of 1994 
As North Korea suffered its fourth year of consecutive economic 
decline, the negotiation climate became quite stale.163 North Korea, after 
the imposition of an IAEA deadline for inspections, accepted minimum 
conditions for resumption of inspections,164 and eventually the United 
States and North Korea agreed to minimum conditions for resuming 
nuclear inspections, cancellation of a 1994 joint military exercise, and a 
renewal of inter-Korean talks.165 However, things quickly went downhill, 
and the IAEA ordered their inspectors home without completion of their 
work.166 After negotiations broke down in further North-South 
conversations, a high-ranking official exclaimed that, “Seoul is not far 
from here . . . [I]f a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire,” which began 
a downward spiral in North-South relations.167 Based on surveillance of 
North Korea’s nuclear facilities in 1989, the CIA estimated 
approximately eight thousand irradiated fuel rods from North Korea’s 
reactor at Yongbyon could have been fabricated into plutonium, which 
meant that North Korea “had the makings of a bomb.”168 In addition to 
the unloading of the fuel rods, two significantly larger reactors were 
nearing completion, and North Korea promised to allow IAEA 
inspections subject to, of course, further agreements.169 Despite talks of 
refueling its original nuclear reactor, North Korea decided to defuel the 
  
 162. Id. at 297. 
 163. See id. at 297-301. 
 164. Id. at 301-02. Although it refused to issue visas to the IAEA inspectors unless 
“a number of preconditions were met.” Id. at 302. 
 165. Id. at 302-03.  
 166. Id. at 303. The IAEA concluded that the legal justifications offered by North 
Korea in refusing “sophisticated measurements” in the plutonium reprocessing plant were 
designed actually to pressure South Korea over the exchange of envoys. Id. 
 167. Id. at 304.  
 168. Id. at 306-07. However, there were some that believed this number was likely 
a scare tactic, and a “worst case scare-nario.” Id. at 307. 
 169. Id. at 308. 
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reactor at an early date, and because of sparring over inspection 
procedures, the removal of the fuel rods took place without IAEA 
observation, and it was discovered that North Korea possessed a second 
homemade defueling machine; further IAEA actions “got nowhere.” 170  
Because of North Korea’s extremely noncommittal behavior, there 
was a push for strong economic sanctions to which Kim Il-sung 
responded, “[S]anctions mean war, and there is no mercy in war.”171 War 
preparations began as the military escalation continued; however, the 
incredibly prohibitive cost of a war in Korea eventually pushed the U.S. 
back towards the diplomacy track.172 While sanctions became a distinct 
possibility, it was Russia that advocated for an inter-Korean conference 
with the U.S., Japan, China, the U.N. and the IAEA; no immediate 
conference took place, but Russia insisted on one before economic 
sanctions.173 China was also against sanctions, but warned North Korea 
that it may not be able to successfully veto U.N. sanctions due to the 
ever-strengthening international support for sanctions; additionally in 
June of 1994, the IAEA board voted to suspend its $500,000 worth of 
assistance to North Korea’s nuclear program, which had the effect of an 
international sanction.174 
These increased tensions possessed the potential for military 
escalation, and it was due to these tensions that former U.S. President 
Carter planned a visit to Kim Il-sung.175 By the time that President Carter 
arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea began to demonstrate signs of 
concession;176 however, South Korean President Kim Young-sam was 
opposed to Carter’s visit as he stated that it “could help [North Korea] 
pursue ‘stalling tactics.’”177 At the end of the U.S.-North Korea talks 
between Carter and Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung agreed to leave IAEA 
  
 170. Id. at 309.  
 171. Id. at 311. 
 172. Id. at 315. 
 173. Id. at 318. 
 174. Id. at 320-21. 
 175. Id. at 317-18. 
 176. This meeting with President Carter was a huge deal for North Korea, as it had 
long attempted to form a direct relationship with the U.S., a direct party to the Armistice 
Agreement unlike South Korea. See id. at 326-27; see also Roh, supra note 5, at 164. 
 177. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 323. 
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inspectors and monitoring equipment in place and Carter promised his 
“support” for North Korea acquiring LWRs.178 
6. The Passing of Kim Il-sung and Ascension of Kim Jung-il 
After the Carter visit, with the plans for U.S. military reinforcement 
and economic sanctions dropped, there was once again hope in the 
North-South relationship, and Kim Il-sung was preparing for a summit 
with President Kim Young-sam.179 However, just a couple of weeks 
before the planned July 25
th
 summit, Kim Il-sung died at the age of 82, 
and the summit never took place.180 After condolences were sent to North 
Korea from the Clinton Administration, there were none that followed 
from the Kim Young-sam Administration, and the Kim Young-sam 
Administration, furthermore, blocked plans by the public to send 
condolences to North Korea for the passing of Kim Il-sung.181 Inter-
Korean relations did not improve with the ascension of Kim Jong-il. Kim 
Young-sam lost popularity because he was perceived as being 
manipulative in North Korea’s request for food aid,182 and later spoke out 
against food aid for North Korea because North Korea poured all of its 
money into its military.183  
  
 178. Id. at 329. President Carter believed that North Korea would have  
preemptively gone to war if sanctions were passed while the U.S. was engaging in 
military exercises with an increased presence in the peninsula. Id. 
 179. Id. at 333-38. 
 180. David E. Sanger, Kim Il Sung Dead at 82; Led North Korea 5 Decades; Was 
Near Talks With South, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1994),  
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/09/world/kim-il-sung-dead-at-age-82-led-north-korea-
5-decades-was-near-talks-with-south.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 181. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 344. 
 182. Id. at 373. 
 183. Id. at 373-74. 
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7. The 1994 Agreed Framework Between the U.S. and North 
Korea 
In August of 1994, U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations finally 
resumed, and early indications pointed to a potential agreement.184 Since 
the idea of freezing its current nuclear program in exchange for modern 
LWR reactors had already been agreed to, talks focused on the 
previously irradiated fuel rods, the reprocessing facility capable of 
extracting plutonium from those rods, and the highly important and 
sensitive IAEA “special inspections” of the two alleged nuclear sites.185 
Eventually, in October of 1994, the U.S. and North Korea reached an 
agreement that consisted of North Korea allowing the “special 
inspections” when a substantial percentage of the components for the 
LWRs had been shipped, and South Korea agreed to pay the majority of 
the costs for providing the LWRs despite not being present at the 
negotiations.186 After another statement of disapproval regarding the 
negotiation process by President Kim Young-sam, the negotiations 
finally concluded with North Korea agreeing to engage in inter-Korean 
dialogue.187 
The product of the years of previous negotiations was titled the 
“Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (1994 Agreed Framework). In 
the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. agreed to (1) arrange the supply of 
LWRs to North Korea, and (2) offset any losses sustained by North 
Korea due to the “freezing” of its nuclear program.188 North Korea, under 
the 1994 Agreed Framework agreed to (1) cooperate with IAEA 
  
 184. Id. at 351. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 354. President Kim Young-sam once again voiced disapproval over the  
negotiations and threatened to “denounce” the U.S.-North Korea agreement; luckily he 
was convinced not to do so. Id. at 355-56. 
 187. Id. at 356. 
 188. Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.S.-N. Kor., Oct. 21, 1994, art. I [hereinafter  
1994 Agreed Framework], available at  
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/a
greedframework.htm. 
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inspections throughout the entire process, (2) remain a part of the NPT, 
and (3) engage in further inter-Korean dialogue.189 Further, both sides 
generally agreed to continue political relations and to honor previously 
made agreements.190 This deal, while viewed as a huge success in North 
Korea,191 left a sour taste in the mouth of South Korea, which despite 
being a “great ally and [close] friend” of the U.S., was completely 
uninvolved in the deal.192 In March of 1995, the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established.193 After 
difficulties emerged in supplying the LWRs in April of 1995, North 
Korea threatened to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework, and an 
agreement was eventually reached in which KEDO would finance and 
supply the LWRs.194 
In a turn of events in 1996, North Korea announced that it would 
unilaterally withdraw from the Armistice Agreement, and claimed that it 
would do so because South Korea was transporting troops and heavy 
weapons into the DMZ,195 and introducing armed soldiers and vehicles 
into the JSA.196 Pursuant to the constitution, President Kim convened a 
National Security Council meeting, and in September, Korea experienced 
a “nationwide manhunt” after a disabled submarine was found off the 
east coast of South Korea.197 After the manhunt, President Kim 
announced that the presence of the submarine infiltrators constituted an 
“armed provocation” and ended South Korea’s involvement in KEDO.198 
President Kim demanded an apology from North Korea for the 
submarine incursion before he would resume South Korea’s involvement 
  
 189. Id. arts. I, III-IV. 
 190. Id. art III-IV.  
 191. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 357. 
 192. Id. at 358.  
 193. Id. at 366. 
 194. Id. at 369. 
 195. This act, if true, would violate the Armistice Agreement. Armistice  
Agreement, supra note 21, § 13a. 
 196. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 387-88. 
 197. Id. 25 North Koreans and 13 South Korean military personnel and civilians 
were killed in the ensuing battle. Id. 
 198. Id. at 389.  
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in KEDO or provide any aid to North Korea.199 North Korea also 
announced that it would not resume talks with South Korea until South 
Korea apologized for its failure to send condolences after the passing of 
Kim Il-sung.200 During a meeting with then U.S. Secretary of State, 
Madeline Albright, President Kim gave assurances that no military action 
would be taken without full coordination with the U.S.201 North Korea 
later expressed “deep regret” regarding the submarine incursion, and 
both Koreas backed off of their earlier hardline stances.202 
E. Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun: The Sunshine Policy & 
Peace and Prosperity 
The North-South relations continued in a state of constant flux until 
Kim Dae-jung, the longtime opposition leader, was elected and exhibited 
a very different North Korea policy than did his predecessor, the first 
President Kim.203 President Kim Dae-jung announced the Sunshine 
Policy,204 as his policy on North Korea.205 The Sunshine Policy had four 
main objectives: (1) to “encourage[] allies . . . to actively engage North 
Korea;” (2) to “address[] North Korea’s economic and humanitarian 
needs rather than respond[] to its strengths;” (3) to concentrate on 
solvable problems and revisit more difficult problems after substantial 
progress is made; and (4) to use both “dialogue and deterrence.”206 In 
focusing on North Korea’s areas of need, special attention was paid to 
the massive gap in trade volume that existed between the two Koreas—
  
 199. Id. 
 200. Roh, supra note 5, at 170. 
 201. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 392. 
 202. Id. at 392-93. Unfortunately, however, the LWR project an KEDO were  
ultimately unsuccessful, and North Korea eventually announced in 2009 that it would 
build its own indigenous LWR. Choe Sang Hun, Progress Is Cited on New Reactor in 
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012).  
 203. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 407.  
 204. The name of this policy alone is very much evocative of the President’s  
constitutional mandate to seek peaceful unification. 
 205. Sung Chul Yang, South Korea’s Sunshine Policy: Progress and 
Predicaments, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 31 (2001). 
 206. Id. at 31-33. 
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$1.48 billion for North Korea and over $260 billion for South Korea—
and to its shortage of food, energy, and hard currency.207 The Sunshine 
policy was designed to “promote[] peace and mutual prosperity,” and 
move away from past strategies where dialogue stopped whenever there 
was a conflict between the two countries.208 Moreover, the Sunshine 
Policy involved “maintaining a strong defense posture based on its 
military alliance with the United States . . . [and helping to] create an 
environment in which North Korea can feel safe in opening up and 
pursuing political and economic reforms.”209 Overall, the basic idea 
behind the Sunshine Policy was that continued economic relations and 
general interactions between the two Koreas would lead to a better inter-
Korean relationship, and therefore would make it less likely that either 
side would resort to military force.210 As a result of this striking change 
in North Korea policy, by 2001, South Korea had become the third 
biggest trading partner of North Korea, and tourism and humanitarian aid 
to North Korea had greatly increased, as did contacts between the two 
Koreas.211  
1. The 2000 Summit Between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung  
However, perhaps the largest and most monumental development 
between the two Koreas since the end of the Korean War occurred in 
June of 2000: the summit between the leaders of the two Koreas, Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Jung-il. In early 2000, there were increased signals 
that North Korea wanted to move towards cooperation, and Kim Dae-
jung’s response was that South Korea would respond as soon as North 
Korea responded to the South Korea’s efforts of peace.212 President Kim 
Dae-jung made it one of his top priorities to have a summit with Kim 
Jung-il, and in April an agreement was reached for a North-South 
  
 207. Id. at 32. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 33. It should also be noted that one of the central premises of the  
Sunshine Policy was North Korea’s transformation into a market state. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 33-34.  
 212. OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 426. 
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Summit to be held in June.213 On June 13, President Kim Dae-jung was 
greeted in North Korea on a red carpet by Kim Jong-il with a “warm 
two-handed handshake and words of welcome.”214 President Kim Dae-
jung received a very impressive and special greeting, and at the end of 
their summit, the two leaders issued a joint declaration.215 The Joint 
Declaration (June 15 Joint Declaration) involved the two leaders 
agreeing to (1) solve the issue of reunification independently, (2) 
recognize the differences between the two governments, (3) solve 
humanitarian issues, such as reuniting families and having communists 
serve prison time in South Korea, (4) cooperate economically and 
stimulate interaction through “civic, cultural, sports, health, 
environmental and other fields,” and (5) hold future talks designed to 
implement these agreements.216 More importantly, North Korea still 
views the “[b]y our nation itself” nature of the June 15 Joint Declaration 
as the cornerstone of its unification policy.217 
Another achievement, or controversy depending on the individual one 
speaks with, of the Kim Dae-jung regime was the founding of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). The KIC development first began in 
1998 on an initiative lead by the Hyundai Group, and its goals were to 
(1) create an industrial park where “South Korean businesses could 
manufacture products using North Korean labor,” (2) “provide an 
opening for North Korea to liberalize and reform its economy,” and (3) 
“ease tensions across the DMZ.”218 The KIC was very important for 
  
 213. Id. at 428.  
 214. Id. at 430. 
 215. Id. at 430-31.  
 216. South-North Joint Declaration, U.S.. INST. OF PEACE (June 15, 2000) 
[hereinafter June 15 Joint Declaration], available at  
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_sko
rea06152000.pdf. 
 217. June 15 Declaration, Guidelines for Korea’s Reunification, KCNA (June 12, 
2013) [hereinafter Guidelines for Korea’s Reunification],  
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201306/news12/20130612-17ee.html. North Korea 
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Koreas]” as well as the reconnection of the roads and airways that had been long severed. 
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 218. MARK E. MANYIN & DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34093, THE 
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North Korea as well, as they were in “desperate need of hard 
currency.”219 While the KIC began as a private endeavor, it remains very 
much supported by the South Korean government.220 Generally, the 
Sunshine Policy saw tremendous success in its dealings with North 
Korea; from the time of the summit until 2005, there were 124 meetings 
and 14 rounds of Cabinet-level talks, whereas after the Korean War there 
were no meetings until 1971.221 From 1971, there was an average of 12 
meetings a year; North-South contact under President Kim Dae-jung 
practically doubled.222 Trade, overland routes between the two Koreas, 
reunited family members, and tourism to North Korea all increased under 
the Kim Dae-jung Administration.223  
However, despite all of the positivity that came from the Sunshine 
Policy, the developments relating to the security realm were rather 
uninspiring.224 The lack of North Korean response to all of President Kim 
Dae-jung’s actions became a source of great political polarization, and in 
fact, the number of South Koreans that supported the Sunshine Policy in 
August of 2000 was 87 percent compared to 34 percent by June of 
2001.225 It seemed to be the case that North Korea very much wanted aid 
from and trade with the South; however, it became clear that North 
Korea did not wish to actually implement the agreements made at the 
summit.226 Despite President Kim Dae-jung winning the Nobel Peace 
Prize227 for his work with North Korea, the Sunshine Policy was not 
  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34093.pdf. 
 219. Pierce Lee, Rules of Origin and the Kaesong Industrial Complex: South 
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 221. Choong Nam Kim, The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North 
Korea 7 (E.-W. Ctr., Working Paper No. 11, 2005). 
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 223. Id. at 7-8.  
 224. Id. at 8. 
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entirely favored in the U.S.; the U.S. wanted to see more work done 
relating to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, whereas South Korea was 
focused on reconciliation.228 Additionally, the hardline policy of 
American President George W. Bush, some South Koreans felt, was 
having an adverse effect on the positive traction that the two Koreas had 
gained under President Kim Dae-jung.229 
In 2002, President Roh Moo-hyun was elected to replace President 
Kim Dae-jung in the midst of anti-American demonstrations in Korea, 
and President Roh controversially expressed that he might favor 
neutrality if war broke out between North Korea and the United States.230 
While President Roh continued the Sunshine Policy that was employed 
by his predecessor, Roh’s policy was actually termed as the “Peace and 
Prosperity Policy.”231 President Roh promised to maintain the Sunshine 
Policy while seeking permanent peace on the peninsula and promoting 
common prosperity in Asia.232 President Roh’s Peace and Prosperity 
Policy involved a three-point approach: (1) resolve North Korea’s 
nuclear crisis in the short term; (2) bring lasting peace to the peninsula in 
the midterm; and (3) build a Northeast Asian economic hub in the long-
term.233 However, the Roh Administration was tasked in dealing with yet 
another North Korean Nuclear Crisis as North Korea began removing all 
international monitoring equipment from its nuclear reactor, and tensions 
  
President Kim Dae-jung took the constitutional mandate of peaceful unification seriously, 
it should be remembered that not all Nobel Peace Prize winners are universally 
celebrated. See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
 228. Kim, supra note 221, at 9. 
 229. Id. at 10. Considering the state of North Korea’s nuclear program and the 
amount of tension that existed throughout this mid 90s, this positive traction was quite 
the accomplishment. The accomplishment is even more astonishing considering that as 
soon as Kim Dae-jung took office North Korea’s ballistic missile test over Japan in 
August of 1998. See OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 410-14. To transform the 
environment from one on with extraordinary tension and one on the brink of war, to one 
focused on peace and with a continued inter-Korean relationship was a remarkable 
accomplishment. 
 230. Kim, supra note 221, at 12. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 12-13.  
 233. Id. at 14. 
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were high considering that it was possible that North Korea would soon 
be a target of America in its war against terrorism.234  
2. North Korea Withdraws from the NPT & The Emergence of 
the Six Party Talks 
Unfortunately for President Roh Moo-hyun, his term as president 
commenced with the “evolving second North Korean nuclear crisis.”235 
The 1994 Agreed Framework had all but collapsed, KEDO had 
suspended heavy fuel deliveries to North Korea, and North Korea as a 
result, “withdrew from the NPT, removed the seals and IAEA monitoring 
equipment, . . . and restarted [its] reactor.”236 North Korea cited multiple 
reasons for its withdrawal including KEDO’s237 decision to suspend 
supply of heavy fuel deliveries, the Bush Administration’s “policy to 
crush [North Korea] with force of arms” and its labeling North Korea as 
being in the “axis of evil.”238 North Korea, however, ultimately left the 
door open for future methods of ensuring only peaceful purposes of its 
nuclear program.239 
After North Korea withdrew from the NPT, trilateral talks were held 
between North Korea, China, and the U.S. to deal with, yet again, North 
Korea’s nuclear program.240 It was the American stance at the time that a 
mere “freezing” of North Korea’s nuclear program was insufficient; thus, 
the U.S. and President Bush called for North Korea to “completely 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program,” and ultimately, the trilateral 
  
 234. Id. at 13.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. This was a huge set back to deal with considering the years that it took for 
North Korea and the U.S. to come to the 1994 Agreed Framework. See OBERDORFER, 
supra note 15, at 351-59. 
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talks were unsuccessful.241 In May of 2003, President Bush and President 
Roh both agreed nuclear weapons in North Korea would not be tolerated 
and sought the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program 
through peaceful, international cooperation.242 With this desire of 
international cooperation, Russia, Japan, and South Korea were added to 
the earlier trilateral talks, and the Six-Party Talks were born.243 Talks 
ultimately did not progress as the U.S. held strong to its position of a full 
dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program before any non-
aggression agreement was entered into between the U.S. and North 
Korea.244 It was not until September 2005 that the Six-Party talks 
produced a 2005 Joint Statement whereby North Korea agreed to 
suspend its nuclear weapon program, the U.S. and South Korea agreed 
not to deploy nuclear weapons on the peninsula, and the remaining 
parties agreed to supply North Korea with energy aid.245 
Despite the agreements in the 2005 Joint Statement, implementation 
of the agreements proved difficult, and later the U.S. designated a 
prominent bank as a “money laundering pawn for North Korea” and 
prevented U.S. financial institutions from doing business with the 
bank.246 As the negotiation climate continued to grow stale, and without 
an agreement on how to implement the 2005 Joint Statement, North 
Korea announced that it planned to conduct a nuclear test in October of 
2006.247 North Korea cited “the extreme threat of a nuclear war and [the 
threat of] U.S. sanctions and pressure” as its reason for the test, and on 
  
 241. Id. See also id. at 178 (Showing that the Bush Administration would only 
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 242. Id. at 169. 
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October 9, 2006, despite the objections of the U.N. Security Council, 
North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test248 that sent “major 
shockwaves [] domestically and internationally.”249 The U.N. Security 
Council quickly passed a resolution condemning the test, demanded that 
North Korea refrain from conducting further nuclear tests and rejoin the 
NPT, and encouraged the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.250 After the 
nuclear test and the following U.N. Security Resolution, the Six-Party 
talks resumed, and ultimately an Implementation Agreement was reached 
regarding the earlier 2005 Joint Statement.251 
3. The 2007 Summit Between Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun 
Despite the international tensions regarding North Korea’s withdrawal 
from the NPT, President Roh, consistent with the constitutional mandate, 
still sought reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula first and 
foremost.252 While Roh had been observed as inexperienced in foreign 
policy issues, it was clear that his North Korea policy was an extension 
of his domestic policies.253 It proved difficult for President Roh to be 
successful in his interactions with the U.S., who urged South Korea to be 
strong in their talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear issues and to 
effectively use the Sunshine Policy and increase interaction and 
communication between the two Koreas at the same time.254 In the early 
stages of the Roh Administration’s tenure, it appeared that the 
conservative policies of the Bush Administration and the liberal policies 
of the Roh regime were incompatible and did not progress North-South 
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relations as much as hoped.255 President Roh claimed that the relationship 
between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea had ceased to be a positive 
impact in the role of inter-Korean relations, and he believed that it was 
very important to establish an independent foreign policy from the U.S. 
and to build a self-reliant military.256 Roh additionally believed that 
China was a suitable alternative to the U.S. as a partner in the Korean 
peninsula because of shared and overlapping interests.257 Later in 2006, 
the U.S. and South Korea reached an agreement for the future wartime 
operational control of the military to be shifted from the U.S. to South 
Korea (commonly referred to as the OPCON transfer), which would 
abolish the prior created CFC and establish separate South Korean and 
U.S. military commands.258 
In July of 2007, the two Koreas happily arranged a summit between 
Kim Jung-il and President Roh for late August.259 The Summit was 
agreed to despite protests from the conservative party that Roh, as a lame 
duck president, would not be able to make a lasting deal with Kim Jong-
il.260 The Summit was postponed until October due to severe floods in 
North Korea; however, on October 2, the second consecutive South 
Korean president flew to North Korea for a Summit with leader Kim 
Jong-il.261 Like President Kim Dae-jung before him, Kim Jong-il met 
President Roh upon his arrival in Pyongyang, with albeit a slightly less 
warm reception, and the two leaders eventually worked out and signed an 
  
 255. Id. at 22. 
 256. Id. at 23-24.  
 257. Id. at 24.  
 258. Hwang, supra note 16, at 6. However, this has yet to occur as the originally 
scheduled date of the transfer, April 2012, was postponed until December 2015. As of 
January 2014, this has yet to happen, and current President Park Geun-hye has requested 
an “indefinite delay in the transition.” See Lee Chi-dong, Pentagon wants ‘conditions-
based’ OPCON transfer to Korea, official says, YONHAP, (Jan. 29, 2014),  
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2014/01/29/26/1200000000AEN2014012900020031
5F.html. 
 259. Aidan Foster-Carter, North Korea-South Korea Relations: Summit Success?, 
3 COMP. CONNECTIONS: Q. E-JOURNAL ONE. ASIAN BILATERAL REL. 1, 1-2 (2007).  
 260. Id. at 2.  
 261. Id. at 4-5.  
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eight-point agreement.262 The Agreement was a substantial one that 
focused on creating a permanent peace between the two Koreas, and it 
contained the statement that the two Koreas “have agreed that their 
highest authorities will meet frequently for the advancement of relations 
between the two sides.”263  This agreement, just like the June 15 Joint 
Declaration, is still very much important to the unification policy of 
North Korea as it stated in a 2013 press release, “[i]f the present [S]outh 
Korean authorities truly want detente and improved [N]orth-[S]outh 
relations, they should take practical steps to implement the June 15 Joint 
Declaration and the October 4 [Joint] Declaration.”264 Most South 
Koreans found the summit useful, despite the near-absence of the nuclear 
issue, but it ultimately did not help to keep the ruling party in charge in 
the 2007 elections.265 
F. Lee Myung-bak: Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity 
Amidst a growing concern regarding the efficacy of the Roh 
Administration’s North Korea Policy, in 2008 the people of South Korea 
elected President Lee Myung-bak who ran on a platform of change.266 
President Lee ran in opposition of the Sunshine Policy, under which the 
previous two administrations had provided nearly $3 billion in aid to 
North Korea.267 President Lee and his administration believed that the 
recent Kim and Roh Administrations were merely appeasing North 
Korea by refraining from focusing on North Korea’s history of human 
rights violations and its growing nuclear program.268 The Sunshine 
  
 262. Id. at 5-6. See Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean 
Relations, Peace and Prosperity, October 4, 2007 [hereinafter October 4 Joint  
Declaration], available at  
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_sko
rea10042007.pdf. 
 263. Foster-Carter, supra note 259, at 6.  
 264. Guidelines for Korea’s Reunification, supra note 217. 
 265. See Foster-Carter, supra note 259, at 9. 
 266. Alisher Khamidov, The Lee Myung-bak Revolution: Explaining Continuity 
and Change in South Korea’s Foreign Policy, SAIS US-Kor. Y.B. 23, 23-24 (2008). 
 267. Id. at 26.  
 268. Id. 
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Policy, according to the Lee Administration, focused too much on a 
continued aid-economic relationship with North Korea considering that 
North Korea continued nuclear tests, ignored requests for returning South 
Korean detainees, and “maintained a belligerent rhetoric” regarding 
events on the Korean peninsula.269  
1. Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity Overview 
Despite recent and substantial success in inter-Korean social and 
economic relationships, it became increasingly clear that North Korea’s 
nuclear strategy had become the means for its survival.270 In order to 
address North Korea’s growing nuclear program, the Lee Administration 
developed as its North Korea policy, Mutual Benefits and Common 
Prosperity.271 The policy included a broad Vision and Guiding Principles 
as well as some Major Tasks.272 The Major Tasks included: (1) 
promoting inter-Korean dialogue with sincerity, (2) establishing peace on 
the Korean peninsula, (3) expanding economic cooperation for mutual 
benefits and common prosperity, (4) expanding cultural and social 
exchange, and finally (5) solving humanitarian issues273–all of which 
were at least facially consistent with the constitutional mandate of 
seeking peaceful unification. However, as is usual with foreign policy 
statements, they appear rather positive and broad at first glance; it was 
very clear that the Lee Administration’s policy was much stronger than 
that of the previous two administrations. 
There were two broad aims in the Lee Administration’s policy: it 
would provide aid to North Korea by improving North Korea’s 
“diplomatic relations with the United States in the process of 
denuclearization” and by facilitating the development of North Korea, 
  
 269. Id. at 27.  
 270. Jung-Ho Bae, Myung-bak Lee Administration’s North Korean Policy and the 
Inter-Korean Relations, in THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (Korea 
Institute for National Unification, 2009). 
 271. Booklet Policy of Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity, Korean Institute 
for National Unification, at 2 [hereinafter Lee Policy]. 
 272. Id. at 12-27. 
 273. Id. at 20-37. 
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South Korea will also “advance its own economic development.”274 The 
Lee Administration sought to exhibit a “pragmatic and result-oriented” 
attitude towards North Korea; in fact, the Lee Administration preferred 
to be labeled as pragmatic despite their membership in the South Korean 
conservative political party.275 
The Lee Administration labeled as one of their tools for the Policy of 
Mutual benefits and Common Prosperity as “Vision 3000 thru 
Denuclearization and Openness;” Vision 3000 was designed to deal with 
the economic difficulties that North Korea was experiencing, which the 
Lee Administration believed was a large reason for North Korea’s 
instability.276 The Lee Administration focused on actually getting North 
Korea to use capitalism,277 similar to earlier socialist countries, and for 
the North Korea’s GNP to reach $3,000.278 The Vision 3000 plan relies 
on continuing the Six Party talks so that North Korea can gain and 
improve diplomatic ties with countries such as Japan and the United 
States.279 Denuclearization was absolutely central to the Lee 
Administration: “[t]he Vision 3000 thru Denuclearization and Openness 
Plan was not developed under the assumption that North Korea would 
first [denuclearize] and [then] open, but rather [was] a policy to 
encourage these processes.”280 
Regarding the necessity of diplomatic ties with the United States, the 
Lee Administration operated under the idea that North Korea would not 
be able to modernize without positive diplomatic relations with the 
  
 274. Bae, supra note 270, at 49. 
 275. Khamidov, supra note 266, at 25-26. 
 276. SUH JAE JEAN, THE LEE MYUNG-BAK GOVERNMENT’S NORTH KOREA POLICY: 
A STUDY ON ITS HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION (Korea Institute for National 
Unification, 2009) at 3, 11-12.  
 277. This represented an incredibly profound departure from nearly all of the prior 
agreements between the two Koreas where both sides agreed to acknowledge and accept 
each other’s political and ideological differences. See, e.g., 1972 Joint Statement, supra 
note 60; 1991 Agreement, supra note 123; June 15 Joint Declaration, supra note 216; and 
October 4 Joint Declaration, supra note 262. 
 278. SUH, supra note 276, at 12.  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 13.  
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United States.281 The $3,000 GNP goal was made under the belief that 
this level of GNP would be the level required for North Korea to 
maintain an independent economy, and the level necessary for the 
emergence of a middle class.282  The Vision 3000 Plan involved three 
main focus areas: (1) parallelism of denuclearization and inter-Korean 
development, (2) increased foreign investment upon denuclearization, 
and (3) the realization of some important platforms of Lee’s presidential 
campaign.283 Once again, since it is difficult to determine whether a 
particular policy is the correct approach by simply looking at the words, 
it is important to look at what took place during the life of the Lee 
Administration and to determine what events and changes are 
attributable to the administration’s North Korean policies.  
2. Important Events During the Tenure of the Lee 
Administration 
Early in Lee’s presidency, President Lee told North Korea that the 
“only [means with which] to stabilize its regime, maintain peace and 
achieve economic prosperity [are to give] up its nuclear program.”284 In 
addition to encouraging North Korea to give up its nuclear program, the 
President demanded that North Korea return South Korean POWs.285 
North Korea responded to these suggestions and demands by claiming 
that the Lee Administration was violating the June 15 Joint Declaration286 
and the October 4 Declaration,287 and labeled Lee as a “traitor” and his 
  
 281. Id. at 16. There is the possibility that previous failures to create such  
relationships may have been attributable to North Korea’s lack of modernization. Id. 
 282. Id. at 17.  
 283. Id. at 17-18. The important campaign platforms included promotion of North 
Korean export communities, creation of an industrial workforce, financing of 
international cooperation funds, the building of an inter-Korean highway to connect to 
peninsula to the rest of Asia, and to restore and ensure the North Korean people’s basic 
human rights. Id. at 17 n.3. 
 284. Khamidov, supra note 266, at 31. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See June 15 Joint Declaration, supra note 216. 
 287. See October 4 Joint Declaration, supra note 262.  
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administration as a “‘racketeer’ operation.”288 In addition, North Korea 
expelled a South Korean official from North Korea and prevented entry 
to two other South Korean officials.289 It was clear from early on that the 
Lee Administration embodied a grand departure from Sunshine 
diplomacy.  
Later in 2008, a South Korean tourist in Mount Keumkang290 was shot 
dead by North Korean soldiers, and the Lee Administration suspended all 
tours to Mt. Keumgang after being denied the opportunity to investigate 
the incident.291 In a continued escalation, North Korea announced a 
suspension of tourist travel to Kaesong, expelled hundreds of South 
Korean workers from the KIC, and directly blamed President Lee for the 
deteriorating state of inter-Korean relations.292 The downward spiral that 
2008 demonstrated continued into the early months of 2009, and the 
failure of Six-Party talks in 2008 cast a lot of doubt regarding Lee’s 
Vision 3000.293 Additionally, negative references to President Lee in 
North Korean publications in early 2009 increased from the previous 
year, and this was highly indicative of the President’s popularity in North 
Korea.294 
In March of 2009, tensions again were increased when South Korea 
did not respond to North Korean demands calling for the cancellation of 
joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, and North Korea predicted an 
imminent war.295 North Korea then cut its military hotline with South 
Korea and detained (as opposed to deporting) a South Korean KIC 
  
 288. Khamidov, supra note 266, at 31.  
 289. Id. 
 290. Tourism to Mount Keumkang was an important product of the Sunshine 
Policies, and likely a large source of income in North Korea. See Kim, supra note 221, at 
7-8.  
 291. Khamidov, supra note 266, at 32. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Paul Elliot, Inter-Korean Relations in 2009: Sources of a Slow 
Reapproachment, 2009 SAIS US-KOR. Y.B. (Johns Hopkins University) 29, 30. 
 294. Id. at 30. The South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) keeps tabs on the 
number of negative references to the South Korean president by North Korean 
publications. The MOU, in this interesting statistic, noted that the number of negative Lee 
references in early 2009 was 9.9 per day compared to the 7.6 per day in 2008. Id. 
 295. Id. 
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worker who encouraged a North Korean female to defect to South 
Korea.296 Additionally, despite international protests, North Korea 
launched a long-range missile, in an effort to send a satellite into orbit 
and conducted a nuclear test, both of which severely damaged any trust 
that existed in South Korea.297 In May of 2009, the Lee Administration 
announced that South Korea would endorse the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), a multinational effort aimed at preventing the trafficking 
of nuclear weapons,298 and North Korea labeled this a “declaration of 
war” and again voided the Armistice Agreement.299 Despite the alarming 
increase in tension, North Korea reduced its criticism of the Lee 
Administration and KIC travel restrictions, which encouraged South 
Korea to allow NGO aid to North Korea to continue.300 Additionally, 
after the passing of former president Kim Dae-jung, Kim Jong-il 
forwarded condolences to the South Korean people.301 Inter-Korean 
relations in 2009 continued to improve: an increase in inter-Korean trade 
was demonstrated, KIC contracts were renewed, and South Korea gave 
North Korea aid in fertilizer during negotiations over family reunions.302 
3. The Sinking of the Cheonan and Shelling of Yeonpyeong 
Island 
The state of inter-Korean relations dramatically worsened when, in 
March of 2010, the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan sank just 
  
 296. Id. at 30-31. See also, William J. Broad, North Korean Missile Launch Was a 
Failure, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2009). 
 297. Elliot, supra note 293, at 31.   
 298. ROK Endorses Proliferation Security Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, (May 
26, 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123842.htm (“PSI participants 
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exchange relevant information, and strengthen national legal authorities.”). 
 299. Elliot, supra note 293, at 31.  
 300. Id. at 29. 
 301. Id. This is distinguished from North Korea’s nuclear test after the passing of 
President Roh Tae-woo earlier in the year, and from the Kim Young-sam administration 
prohibiting condolences to North Korea on the passing of Kim Il-sung. Id. at 31; 
OBERDORFER, supra note 15, at 344. 
 302. Elliot, supra note 293, at 33-34.  
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south of the NLL.303 While at the time of the sinking there was no official 
conclusion as to who or what was responsible for the sinking, South 
Korea, supported by experts from the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden, reported in September that “[t]he [South Korean] 
Navy ship Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack while 
conducting a normal mission in the vicinity of [Baekryeong] Island.”304 
Despite the fact that North Korea denied such involvement, the United 
Nations condemned the sinking of the Cheonan, expressed concern over 
the findings of the ROK-lead Investigation Group, and urged both 
Koreas to fully adhere to the Armistice Agreement.305 The sinking of the 
Cheonan constituted an entirely different act of North Korean hostility, 
and it was the first act of this magnitude since North Korean terrorists306 
bombed KAL flight 858 more than 20 years ago.307 Unfortunately, South 
Korea convinced neither Russia nor China of North Korea’s guilt in the 
torpedo attack, and therefore, the sinking of the Cheonan remained “a 
crime and an obstacle.”308 Due to the failure in convincing Russia and 
China of North Korea’s culpability, crafting a proper response was 
difficult; the Lee Administration relied on naval exercises and placed a 
ban on trade with North Korea.309 Eventually, however, tensions began to 
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lessen, and talks resumed with focus on family reunions and the 
resuming tourism to Mt. Keumgang.310 These tensions continued to 
lessen until November of 2010. 
Just two months after North Korea introduced Kim Jong-un311 as the 
successor to his father Kim Jong-il, North Korea “fired scores of artillery 
shells at [Yeonpyeong] Island”312 and killed two soldiers and wounded 
three civilians in “the first attack on a civilian area since the Korean 
War.”313 The attack came at the beginning of a military exercise, in 
which North Korea accused South Korea of firing into their territorial 
waters.314 One of the North Korean gunmen responsible for the shelling 
was quoted: 
Fire burned in our eyes when we saw [South Korean] artillery shells 
fall into our territorial waters. We poured our merciless thunderbolt of 
revenge on them. When we saw the first shell hit the enemy’s radar 
post and several pillars of fire soar there, shouts of ‘Hurrah’ celebrated 
our victory . . . .
315
 
It was assumed that North Korea was escalating tensions to coincide 
with the succession of then General Kim Jong-un.316 Regardless of the 
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 311. Kim Jong-un was introduced by North Korea as a four-star general and the 
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reason for the shelling of Yeonpyeong, the end of 2010 came with 
President Lee being under political fire, and the current North Korean 
policy did not seem to be working.317 
4. The Passing of Kim Jong-il and Ascension of Kim Jong-un 
Much of 2011 experienced President Lee being viewed as a lame 
duck president, with whom therefore negotiations would not prove 
beneficial, and eyes were already turning towards the 2012 election 
where current President Park Geun-hye was viewed as the favorite.318 
Park Geun-hye presented a somewhat softer stance on North Korea.319 
President Lee seemed content to wait for a regime change thinking that 
the change in leadership would be necessary to improve the inter-Korean 
relations.320 On December 17, 2011, President Lee appeared to get his 
wish of a regime change when Kim Jong-il died of a heart attack.321 After 
the passing of Kim Jong-il, and unlike President Kim Young-sam, the 
Lee Administration offered condolences to the North Korean people (not 
to the government), and it allowed the widow of Kim Dae-jung and 
Hyun Jeong-eun, the chair of the Hyundai Group responsible for 
development of the KIC, to travel to North Korea to give their 
condolences.322 
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In addition to North Korea being hesitant in dealing with a lame duck 
president, in early 2012, a large-scale anti-Lee campaign was undertaken, 
and it featured continuous verbal attacks against President Lee.323 In a 
continued “e-war” between the two Koreas, North Korea escalated 
tensions with the Lee Administration by posting some violent political 
cartoons to their official websites where they likened him to a rat; one 
such cartoon was titled “Myung Bak Strangled to Death.”324 North Korea 
also threatened to attack the “paid conservative media” of South Korea 
as well.325 At the end of President Lee’s term in office, most Koreans 
viewed his North Korean polices as a failure.326 Much of the progress in 
North-South relations that had been generated under the previous two 
administrations (despite the lack of progress in denuclearization) had 
been shattered.327 Is the policy of the Lee Administration to blame for 
this? It is not the purpose of this note to assign blame solely to the Lee 
Administration for the worsening of the North-South relationships from 
2007 through 2012; however it is clear that a change in policy was 
required. 
III. THE PARK GEUN-HYE ADMINISTRATION  
In late 2012, Park Geun-Hye was elected as the first female president 
of South Korea; she is the daughter of former President-Dictator Park 
Chung-hee, who ruled South Korea in the 1960’s and 70’s. Park was first 
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elected to public office in 1998; however, sympathy for losing both of 
her parents to assassins’ bullets likely played a role at first.328 Eventually 
though, Park Geun-hye began to take the political world by storm and 
earned the nickname “Election Queen” when she was elected to head the 
conservative Grand National Party in 2004.329 Self-discipline and 
authority became two things that Park was known for, and it is said that 
she has a strong aura around her as the daughter of a former president.330 
While some claim that President Park can be “uncommunicative” and 
exhibit “iciness”331 at times, it will be very interesting to see how her 
strength and focus on trust plays out in the current administration’s 
dealings with North Korea.  
A. Park’s Trustpolitik 
The World received its first glimpse of what Park Geun-hye 
Administration’s stance on North Korea might look like from an article 
she wrote in 2011. Trust was the most common word in her article when 
she wrote that “[a] lack of trust has long undermined attempts at genuine 
reconciliation between North and South Korea.”332 She noted that any 
confidence or trust that existed was lost after the shelling of Yangpyeong 
Island and the sinking of the Cheonan,333 and the recent purge of Kim 
Jong-un’s uncle and high-ranking government official, Jang Song 
Thaek,334 is highly unlikely to help in rebuilding trust.  
President Park was elected despite an opposing party that ran 
advocating a deeper return to the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung 
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Administration.335 Under the Park Administration, there will likely be no 
return to the Sunshine Policy; it is Park’s position that South Korea 
should adopt trustpolitik as its policy and should establish mutually 
binding expectations based on international norms.336 Park wrote that 
trustpolitik should consist of two separate and coexisting prongs: “first, 
North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the 
international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and 
second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the 
peace.”337 Both of these requirements seem in keeping with the 
constitutional mandate requiring the President to seek peaceful 
unification. According to President Park, a new policy is needed, one that 
takes into account public consensus and remains constant throughout 
political transitions.338 On paper, one can see a difference between the 
Lee and Park policies.  
In Park Geun-hye’s 2011 article, she acknowledged that should North 
Korea “[take] steps toward genuine reconciliation, then [South Korea] 
should match its efforts.”339 The word trust was mentioned with a higher 
frequency than the word nuclear, and trust is definitely the focal point of 
her North Korean Policy. While Park aimed for a policy that fell between 
the Sunshine Policy and that of the Lee Administration, it is clear that 
she would require affirmative steps from North Korea, such as North 
Korea “reaffirming its commitment to existing agreements” (likely 
referring to previous Joint Declarations and the Armistice Agreement) 
before South Korea would be ready to talk.340 Like President Lee, Park’s 
idea of a proper North Korea policy also focused on denuclearization; in 
a section of her article titled “Bringing Pyongyang Into the Fold,” Park 
specifically focused on the need of North Korea to “dismantle [its] 
nuclear program,” and wrote that “[u]nder no circumstances can South 
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Korea accept the existence of a nuclear-armed North Korea.”341 North 
Korea even questioned whether Park’s policy is any different from the 
Lee administration’s policy when it asked “[i]s [her] call for ‘scrapping 
nuclear program first’ different from the [Lee Myung-bak] watchwords 
of ‘no nukes, opening and 3000 dollars’?”342 
The new Park Administration brings along with it hope (and also 
anxiety) for progress in the North-South relation, and despite Park’s 
membership in the same political party as President Lee, Park’s policy 
does aim at falling somewhere in the middle of the policies employed by 
the prior three administrations.343 In order to make a prediction of how 
Park’s Trust Politik will work in the North-South relationship, a mere 
dissection of words from articles and policies will not be sufficient. The 
remaining portion of this note will focus on the events from the first 
calendar year of Park’s presidency in order to (1) determine where Park’s 
policy lies in relation to past administrations’ policies and (2) predict 
how Park’s policy will affect the North-South relationship in the future.  
B. The 2013 North Korean Aggression 
In December of 2012, just before Park was elected President and 
despite being banned by UN Sanctions from such activity, North Korea 
launched a satellite on a long-range rocket, which brought much 
condemnation from the international community.344 According to Japan, 
South Korea, and the United States, the launch constituted “a test of 
technology that could one day deliver a nuclear warhead capable of 
hitting targets as far away as the continental United States,” whereas 
North Korea claimed that it was merely launching a weather satellite.345 
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In addition to the United Nations and the countries that historically have 
been positioned against similar North Korean acts, China also expressed 
“deep concern” prior to the scheduled launch.346 The United Nations 
passed a strong Resolution in January, about a month before President 
Park took office, which condemned the launch of the satellite, confirmed 
previous existing sanctions, and put in place travel bans and asset freezes 
on four North Korean individuals and six organizations/corporations.347 
As per usual, after such Security Council measures, North Korea was 
intent on demonstrating that “it would not be cowed,”348 and this 
appeared to be the case as the Rodong Sinmun349 published an article 
writing that a nuclear test was the “demand of the people,” and reports of 
imminent nuclear tests were common throughout the news.350 
Just two weeks before the official inauguration of President Park, in 
spite of the U.N. sanctions already in place, North Korea conducted its 
third nuclear test, successfully detonating a nuclear device in a 
northeastern province.351 On February 25, 2013, President Park was 
inaugurated in Seoul, and urged that North Korea “[abandon] its nuclear 
ambitions.”352 Park further emphasized North Korea’s nuclear 
capabilities in her speech by stating that “North Korea’s recent nuclear 
test is a challenge to the survival and future of the Korean people, and 
there should be no mistake that the biggest victim will be none other than 
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North Korea itself.”353 President Park also put her military on high alert 
the day after her inauguration.354 On March 7, 2013, the U.N. Security 
Council passed another resolution in response to the nuclear tests, which 
further increased sanctions with a focus on bulk cash transfers.355 North 
Korea again dismissed the U.N. sanctions as “a U[.]S[.] plot,” and also 
angrily protested the joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, Key 
Resolve and Foal Eagle.356 The Rodong Sinmun called the military 
exercises “‘extremely perilous provocation for nuclear preemptive 
strike’, and said that the situation ‘may bring about an all-out war.’”357  
In early March, North Korea yet again declared that the Armistice 
Agreement was nullified,358 and later entered a state of war.359 In a 
statement made by the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), North 
Korea announced that “[i]f the U.S. and the South Korean puppet group 
perpetrate a military provocation for igniting a war against the DPRK 
(North Korea) in any area… it will not be limited to a local war but 
develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war.”360 In addition to entering a 
state of war, North Korea, without notice, refused entry into the KIC to 
South Korean vehicles and personnel.361 South Korean workers in the 
KIC were permitted to leave to South Korea, but few did so out of fear 
  
 353. Id. 
 354. Tensions Rise as Both Koreas Hold Military Exercises, NKNEWS.ORG (Feb. 
25, 2013), http://www.nknews.org/2013/02/new-president-inaugurated-in-seoul-north- 
korea-tops-agenda/. 
 355. S.C. Res. 2094, ¶¶ 11, 14, Annex I-II, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2094 (Mar. 7, 2013).  
 356. Foster-Carter, supra note 348, at 2-4.  
 357. North Korea Conduct Successful Nuclear Test, supra note 351. However, it 
should be noted that North Korea is informed in advance of where and when the 
exercises will take place, so it is hardly provocation for a preemptive nuclear strike. 
Foster-Carter, supra note 348, at 2-3.  
 358. Choe Sang-hun, North Korea Declares 1953 War Truce Nullified, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/world/asia/north-korea- 
says-it-has-nullified-1953-korean-war-armistice.html?_r=0; Important Measures, supra  
note 36. 
 359. North Korea Enters “State of War”, NKNEWS.ORG (Feb. 25, 2013),  
http://www.nknews.org/2013/03/north-korea-enters-state-of-war/. 
 360. Id. It is worth noting that North Korea referred to Kim Jong-un as “the 
greatest-ever commander” as the time for a “do-or-die final battle” came near. Foster-
Carter, supra note 348, at 4.  
 361. Id. at 5.  
878 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.3 
 
they would not be able to return.362 Finally, on April 8, North Korea 
announced that (1) it would withdraw all employees from the KIC, and 
that it would (2) temporarily suspend all operations until it determined 
whether or not to close the KIC.363 With the closing of the KIC, a product 
of the Sunshine Era and a great source of income and investment for 
North Korea, tensions regarding the possibility of war continued to 
heighten; the North Korean military even confirmed that it had been 
given “final approval for a nuclear strike.”364 
This characteristic North Korean saber-rattling changed course mid-
2013 when North Korea both invited South Korean firms in the KIC to 
actually come and inspect the factories and officially proposed inter-
Korean talks regarding the KIC.365 North Korea also proposed talks 
regarding the Mt. Keumkang tourist site, another product of the Sunshine 
Era.366 Before the talks took place, there were some hiccups involving 
who would be sent to represent the respective countries.367 Talks 
continued in early July, and North Korea attempted to speed up talks to a 
rapid reopening of the KIC; however, the Park Administration, true to its 
policy, insisted “there [are] lessons to be learned, principles to [be agreed 
upon], and priorities to set if inter-Korean trust and cooperation [is] to be 
rebuilt and go forward.”368 At first, the Park Administration’s negotiation 
strategy appeared rather risky, but it did work; North Korea called for 
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further talks, and the two sides agreed to reopen the KIC in a five-point 
agreement.369 South Korea did quite well in the Agreement in getting 
North Korea to agree to language such as “[t]he two Koreas will not 
make Kaesong suffer again from the stoppage of the complex by such 
things as restrictions on passage and the withdrawal of the workforce,” as 
well as to the creation of an inter-Korean committee on the KIC.370 In 
September, the two Koreas agreed to restore their military hotline, which 
would be active 24 hours a day,371 and agreed to reopen the KIC.372 
Despite the reopening of the KIC, there was no progress made in 
family reunions, as North Korea insisted on family reunions in tandem 
with reopening tourism to Mt. Keumkang.373 South Korea, despite 
tentatively agreeing to talks on Mt. Keumkang earlier in the summer, 
appeared unwilling to do so now, and likely, President Park “[wanted] to 
build trust one step at a time.”374 Relations between the two Koreas 
regressed as 2013 came to an end with North Korea demanding South 
Korean KIC firms pay taxes for 2013, despite previously agreeing 
otherwise, and with increased North Korean insults towards President 
Park.375 In fact, one North Korea commentator wisely noted that North 
Korea “[has] a long way to go to convince South Korea” that they have 
changed and to provide the Park Administration the trust that it 
requires.376 This statement turned out to be very true, and the events 
surrounding the execution of Jang Song Thaekare a perfect illustration of 
just how far North Korea and Kim Jong-un have to go.377 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND EXPECTATIONS 
It is clear that the Armistice Agreement is either dying or on its last 
legs, as North Korea has unilaterally either cancelled or threatened to 
cancel it multiple times. 378 Despite the Armistice Agreement being 
designed with the goal of arriving at a quickly agreed-upon peace 
agreement to supplant it,379 it has more-or-less survived for 60 years, and 
we have not had a large-scale war between the two Koreas since its 
creation. While no permanent treaty has yet been created to replace the 
Armistice Agreement, the two Koreas accomplished such bilateral 
agreements as the 1972 Joint Statement, the 1991 Agreement, the 1992 
Accord, the June 15 Joint Declaration, and the October 4 Declaration, 
which all emphasize the importance of unification.380 Additionally, 
peaceful unification has remained present in the South Korean 
Constitution381 as a presidential mandate since 1972.382 
Another, perhaps unintentional, byproduct of the Armistice 
Agreement is the multilateral nature of inter-Korean relations.383 One 
inference that can easily be drawn from the Six-Party Talks of the 2000’s 
is that the state of inter-Korean relations is of large importance to the 
major powers of the world. However, it is the position of this note that 
the “multilateralization” of inter-Korean relations has been and will 
continue to be an impediment to inter-Korean progress. It is true that 
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North Korea has long equated the United States as its “negotiation 
partner” in inter-Korean issues,384 and pursued a bilateral relationship 
with the United States; however, the two Koreas have agreed to “resolve 
the question of [unification] independently”385 pursuant to “the spirit of 
‘by-the-Korean-people-themselves,’”386 and this bilateral relationship 
gives the two Koreas their best chance at peace and eventual unification.  
The ultimate failure of the Six-Party Talks is illustrative of the 
unworkability of the “multilateralization” of inter-Korean relations. The 
Six-Party Talks arose after North Korea announced its withdrawal from 
the NPT,387 and centered around North Korea’s ultimate 
denuclearization.388 However, the Six-Party talks ultimately failed in 
reaching a consensus and North Korea has declared that linking 
unification with denuclearization would “push inter-Korean relations into 
a deeper abyss of confrontation and ruin.”389 Additionally, U.N. 
involvement, whether it be sanctions390 or statements391 by the Security 
Council on North Korea, have proven to be largely ineffective in 
bringing about positive changes in inter-Korean relations. Additionally, 
simple common sense tells us that while it is difficult for any particular 
South Korean administration to have an effective North Korea policy, 
unification becomes practically impossible, as each administration is 
required to adapt their North Korea policy to reflect the policies of 
additional countries. Consider, as an example, that Kim Dae-jung’s 
diplomacy-based Sunshine Policy,392 responsible for the first inter-
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Korean presidential summit393 and joint ventures such as the KIC,394 
coincided with U.S. President George W. Bush’s more hardline 
denuclearization first policy, whereby President Bush labeled North 
Korea as a member of the “axis of evil.”395 Given the difficulties that 
arise when the United States and South Korea are not on the same page 
regarding North Korea, it is easy to see that getting the United States, 
Japan, Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea to all be on the 
same page is not a realistic goal; “multilateralization” is impossibly 
difficult, and any hope of unification or simple improvement in inter-
Korean relations requires a bilateral relationship between the two Koreas. 
Regarding South Korea’s North Korea policy and the bilateral 
relationship between the two Koreas generally, President Park’s policy 
has proven quite strong, and thus far, consistent. Since her article in 
Foreign Affairs two years before she was inaugurated as president, she 
has emphasized the need for trust in the inter-Korean relationship. 
President Park focused on trust in her inauguration speech,396 and the 
world witnessed some truth to her words during the 2013 KIC 
negotiations with North Korea.397 It is early in Park’s tenure as President, 
and it is likely too early to determine whether Trustpolitik is a success or 
failure in its goal of seeking peaceful unification.  
There have been both instances of success and failure in Park’s first 
year as President. Park’s strategy in the KIC negotiations paid off with a 
successful bilateral agreement to reopen the complex.398 However, the 
Park Administration’s decision not to engage North Korea in attempting 
to reopen Mt. Keumgang could be seen as a mistake. While the Park 
Administration is proving to be “ultra-cautious,” South Korean 
presidents only serve for five years, and “[a] snail’s pace will not cut 
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it.”399 Despite its criticisms of being too one-sided, the success in inter-
Korean relations that the Sunshine Policy brought came directly from the 
idea that “continued economic relations and general interactions between 
the two Koreas would lead to a better inter-Korean relationship, and 
therefore, would make it less likely that either side would resort to 
military force.” 400 The Sunshine Policy was very much in keeping with 
the duty of seeking peaceful unification. It is the view of this note that 
the ideas which the Sunshine Policy brought, and could continue to 
bring, improved inter-Korean relations; when two countries interact in 
both economic (Kaesong and Keumkang) and humanitarian (family 
reunions) fields on a consistent basis, an interdependence is naturally 
created, thus reducing the possibility of additional hostilities.  
On the other hand, while the Lee Administration’s North Korea policy 
was viewed as a failure,401 despite the events leading up to the Six-Party 
talks making it clear to the world that North Korea’s nuclear program 
needed to be monitored and that the Sunshine Policy brought a great 
amount of improvement in inter-Korean relations, the emergence of Kim 
Jong-un in North Korea has very likely created the need of a North 
Korea policy based on trust-building. Ultimately, it is doubtful that Kim 
Jong-un would begin a war with either the United States or South 
Korea,402 but a 30-year-old leader in North Korea who recently executed 
his uncle is problematic, to say the least, for hopes of an improved 
North-South relationship.  
When it comes down to it, written words on paper do not amount to 
effective North Korea Policy, but the words involved in Trustpolitik are 
on point. President Park wrote in 2011 that the trust between the two 
Koreas “virtually disappeared” after North Korea was determined 
responsible for sinking the Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island.403 
Trust as of early 2014 cannot have improved sufficiently since Park 
wrote “A New Kind of Korea” in 2011. Ultimately, important questions 
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remain regarding Trustpolitik: will Park’s iciness404 or her slavish 
following of formalism405 prove to be obstacles to peaceful unification? 
Or will her braveness and “cool under fire” persona406 aid her in showing 
strength in building a lasting trust with North Korea? Predictions are 
difficult. Hopefully Park’s policies continue to demonstrate success407 
and pave the way towards the possibility of a lasting peace agreement 
between the two Koreas and potential unification. The Armistice 
Agreement will turn 61 years-old this year and has been unilaterally 
voided by North Korea on multiple occasions, how much life does it 
have left in it? 
V. APPENDIX 
A. Korean Presidents: 1948-2014 
1. Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1948 – 1960 
2. Yoon Bo-Seon, 1960 – 1962 
3. Park Chung-hee, 1962 – 1979 
4. Choi Kyu-ha, 1979 – 190 
5. Chun Doo-hwan, 1980 – 1988 
6. Roh Tae-woo, 1988 – 1993 
7. Kim Young-sam, 1993 – 1998 
8. Kim Dae-jung, 1998 – 2003 
9. Roh Moo-hyun, 2003 – 2008 
10. Lee Myung-bak, 2008 – 2013 
11. Park Geun-hye, 2013 - 2018 
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